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Applying Antidumping Law to Perishable Agricultural Goods 
The sixty-year-old American antidumping statute, now codified 
as part of the Tariff Act of 1930,1 protects domestic industries from 
the "dumping" of foreign goods.2 Under the Act, dumping occurs 
when foreign goods are sold in this country at "less than fair value."3 
A good has been sold at less than fair value when the price prevail-
ing in either the exporter's home market or a third-country market 
exceeds its price in an American market.4 The Act authorizes the 
imposition of antidumping duties on goods sold at less than fair 
value if such sales have caused, or threaten to cause, material injury 
to a domestic industry.5 
Although restrictions on dumping have been justified on a 
number of grounds,6 the legislative history of the antidumping stat-
ute and sound economic policy suggest that Congress was primarily 
concerned with predatory dumping - sales intended to secure mo-
nopoly power in an American market. 7 Reflecting this anti predatory 
orientation, the Act does not condemn all instances of price discrimi-
nation. Before comparing prices of imported goods with prices in 
foreign markets, the Commerce Department8 makes a series of ad-
1. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1677g (Supp. III 1979). The antidumping law was formerly codified 
in the Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1976). The Trade Agreements Act of 
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, amended the antidumping statute and recodifed it under 
the Tariff Act of 1930, see 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1677g (Supp. III 1979). The antidumping provi-
sions of the Tariff Act "in large measure retain the substantive law of the 1921 Act." 45 Fed. 
Reg. 8182 (1980). Because of the close similarity of the new antidumping statute to the origi-
nal version, this Note will occasionally refer to the legislative history of the 1921 Act. 
2. Dumping is defined broadly as price discrimination between national markets. See gen-
erally J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1923). The only kind of 
price discrimination the importing country is concerned with, however, is that in which the 
export price is lower than the foreign market price. 
3. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. III 1979). See text at notes 29-35 infra. 
4. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (Supp. III 1979). The act also reaches merchandise that is sold at 
prices below average cost, in appropriate circumstances. See text at notes 46-49 & 119-26 
infra. 
5. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. III 1979); text at note 22 infra. 
6. For a summary of the various arguments for the restriction of dumping, see Barcel6, 
Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade- The United States and the International Antidumping 
Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 500-10 (1972). 
7. See text at notes 92-100 infra. Under a predatory pricing scheme, a foreign firm sells at 
lower than its home market price - and lower than the prevailing domestic price - to drive 
competitors out of business. Once it has eliminated much of its competition, it will have at-
tained market power enabling it to raise prices in the U.S. to levels higher than those that 
prevailed before the predatory action began. See Barcel6, supra note 6, at 500. 
8. With the exception of a few functions reserved to the Customs Service, responsibility for 
administering the antidumping law was transferred to the Department of Commerce from the 
Department of Treasury in early 1980, pursuant to an executive order by President Carter that 
coincided with the effective date of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 
Stat. 144. See Exec. Order 12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980). The subdivision within the Com-
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justments to both sets of prices that may reduce or eliminate initial 
price differentials.9 Even after these adjustments have been made, a 
less-than-fair-value finding will not result if only a small percentage 
of a producer's goods are dumped or if the price differentials are 
extremely small.10 
Despite these safeguards against penalizing importers for inno-
cent price variations, the traditional price comparison formula will 
too often yield a less-than-fair-value finding in cases involving per-
ishable agricultural goods. Substantial variations in the price of per-
ishable goods are common, and do not necessarily reflect predatory 
behavior. These price variations are a natural consequence of the 
peculiar supply, demand, and market conditions facing producers of 
perishable goods. But the traditional price comparison formula ig-
nores these conditions. Application of this formula to cases involv-
ing perishable agricultural goods, therefore, could contravene the 
purpose of the Act. 
The problems associated with applying antidumping law to agri-
cultural commodities have not been thoroughly explored because 
most dumping cases have involved manufactured goods, 11 which, as 
a class, exhibit less price variation than agricultural goods. 12 But as 
the world economy becomes increasingly interdependent and Ameri-
can imports of perishable agricultural goods become more signifi-
merce Department that administers the antidumping law is the International Trade Adminis-
tration. The Office of Investigations of the Import Administration is responsible for 
conducting antidumping investigations. This Note will use the term "Co=erce Department" 
to refer to the body responsible for the administration of the Act. 
9. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4) (Supp. III 1979); 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.14, 353.15, 353.16 (1981). 
The antidumping statute and regulations provide for adjustments for differences in quantities, 
physical characteristics, and circumstances of sale. The importance of the various adjustments 
to the ultimate disposition of the case is emphasized in Ehrenhaft, What the Antidumping and 
Countervailing J)uty Provisions of the Trade Agreements Act /Can/ [Will/ /Should/ Mean far 
U.S. Trade Policy, 13 LAW & POLICY INTL. Bus. 1361, 1366-67 (1974), where the author indi-
cates that most antidumping cases will be won or lost on the basis of which price adjustments 
are allowed and which are not. 
IO. The price comparison procedures are not codified in the statutes or regulations. The 
Co=erce Department, however, has to date used a de minimis standard for the determination 
of price discrimination or sales at less than fair value. This de minimis standard is consistent 
with the theory that price discrimination involving small absolute price differences or only a 
small fraction of imports does not manifest predatory intent and thus should not be subject to 
the possible imposition of dumping duties. 
11. For a summary of all antidumping actions initiated between 1972 and 1977, see U.S. 
GAO, REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. ADMINISTRA-
TION OF THE ANTIDUMPING ACT OF 1921, at 70 (1979) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT]. Of 
the 134 actions initiated in that period, only two involved agricultural products, and one of 
those actions involved a nonperishable agricultural good (canned pears). For a summary of 
the dollar value of imports that were the subject ofantidumping actions for roughly the same 
period, see Possible Amendments to the 1916 Antidumping Act, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
International Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 82-83 (1980) (im-
ports in the "food and kindred products" category comprised .306 billion of the total 11.735 
billion dollars worth of imports subject to antidumping actions). 
12. See note 56 infra. 
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cant, 13 the antidumping law will probably be invoked more 
frequently against foreign agricultural producers. 14 One current ex-
ample of such a case is Certain Fresh Winter Vegetables from Mex-
ico 15 (M'exican Vegetables). 
In Mexican Vegetables, the Commerce Department attempted to 
avoid some of the problems inherent in applying the traditional price 
comparison formula to perishable goods by using an alternative 
methodology.16 This Note argues that the general sort of 
13. The United States is currently, and will be for the foreseeable future, a net exporter of 
agricultural goods. See R. KOHLS & J. UHL, MARKETING OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 130 
(5th ed. 1980) (reporting agricultural trade balance (excess of exports over imports] of 12 bil-
lion dollars in 1976). The dollar value of agricultural imports increased from 5.8 billion in 
1971 to 9.6 billion in 1975, an increase of 65%, id., while the consumer price index for the same 
period increased only 29%. D. LEABO, BASIC STATISTICS 360 (table 12.l) (5th ed. 1976). Al-
though some 40% of agricultural imports are classified as "complementary" -i.e., they do not 
compete directly with U.S. agricultural goods - some 60% of agricultural imports "compete 
directly with domestically produced food products and are increasing relative to complemen-
tary agricultural imports." These directly competitive agricultural imports include meat, fruits 
and vegetables, and sugar. R. KOHLS & J. UHL, supra, at 140. 
14. Among the few cases involving perishable agricultural commodities are Chicken Eggs 
in the Shell from Canada, 40 Fed. Reg. 16,687 (1975) (no less-than-fair-value sales found); 
Chicken Eggs in the Shell from Mexico, 36 Fed. Reg. 5387 (1971) (less-than-fair-value sales 
found); Concord Grapes from Canada, 34 Fed. Reg. 7460 (1969) (less-than-fair-value sales 
found). 
Former Senator Stone of Florida suggested the possibility that future antidumping peti-
tions Inight be brought regarding such perishables as "citrus from Brazil" and "avocadoes 
[and] fruits of all kinds from Caribbean countries, from Brazil ... (and] from Asian countries 
coming into California." See Nominations of Robert E. Herzslein, C Moxley Feathers/on, Wil-
liam M. Fay, Charles R. Simpson, Edna Parker, and Sheldon V. Ekman, Hearings Before the 
Sen. Comm on Finance, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-46 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Herzslein Hear-
ings]. For an indication of the type and source of perishable fruit and vegetables currently 
being imported by the U.S., see generally FISCAL YEAR 1980, U.S. IMPORTS OF FRUITS AND 
VEGETABLES UNDER PLANT QUARANTINE REGULATIONS, MAR. 1981, at 1-19 (available from 
World Analysis Branch, Intl. Econ. Division, Econ. and Statistics Service, U.S. Dept. of 
Agriculture). 
15. 44 Fed. Reg. 63,588 (1979) (tentative determination of sales at not less than fair value), 
45 Fed. Reg. 20,512 (1980) (final determination of sales at not less than fair value). 
The Mexican Vegetables antidumping investigation was initiated by several organizations 
representing Florida vegetable growers. The vegetable imports from Mexico subject to the 
investigation were tomatoes, eggplant, peppers, squash, and cucumbers. Although the Treas-
ury Department originally had jurisdiction over the case, the Commerce Department took 
over when the executive order shifting international trade responsibilities to it became effec-
tive. See note 8 supra. 
Mexican Vegetables attracted considerable attention in Washington and in the national 
press. See, e.g., Rollen Tomato, Wall St. J., July 2, 1979, at 12, col. I; Smashing OTEC, Wall 
St. J., Mar. 14, 1980, at 22, col. I; Tomato Surprise, Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 1980, at 22, col, I. One 
executive branch policy-maker who took a keen interest in the case was Alfred Kahn, Presi-
dent Carter's chief inflation fighter. Dr. Kahn, who openly sided with the Mexican growers, 
made this memorable statement on their behalf while testifying before the Joint Economic 
Cominittee in April 1979: "We will pursue Mexican tomatoes until we get some real tomatoes 
to eat rather than those pieces of stone that [laughter] have the virtue that they can be picked 
up by machines but not eaten." Monitoring Inflation: Hearings Before the Join/ Economic 
Comm of the Cong. of the U.S., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1979) (statement of Alfred E. Kahn). 
The case is currently on appeal. Southwest Florida Winter Vegetable Growers Association 
v. United States, No. 80-4-00577 (Ct. Intl. Trade, filed April 3, 1980). 
16. The appropriateness of this test is one of the issues currently being contested on appeal, 
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econometric test relied on by the Commerce Department in Mexican 
Vegetables represents a clear improvement over traditional price 
comparison methodology. Part I outlines important procedural and 
substantive aspects of the antidumping enforcement scheme and 
identifies several features of the traditional methodology that in-
crease the likelihood of a less-than-fair-value finding in cases involv-
ing substantial price variation. Part II analyzes the economic 
characteristics of perishable agricultural goods that often produce 
wide variations in their prices. Part III finds that both the legislative 
history of the antidumping statute and economic theory proscribe 
only predatory pricing behavior, and argues that in most cases the 
price variation associated with perishable agricultural products is 
normal rather than predatory. Finally, Part IV considers in some 
detail the various econometric17 and statistical tests that might be 
used to remedy the deficiencies of the traditional price comparison 
formula. 
I. ANTIDUMPING LAW 
A. Investigative and .Duty Assessment Procedures 
The procedural regime of the antidumping law can be conve-
niently divided into investigative and duty assessment stages.18 The 
modification that this Note proposes for the price comparison treat-
ment of perishable agricultural commodities would apply only to the 
investigative stage. That stage is designed, broadly speaking, to un-
cover dumping that may injure an American industry. Before duties 
are imposed, the Commerce Department must find that sales at less 
than fair value are occurring, and the International Trade Commis-
sion (ITC)19 must determine that these sales are causing, or threaten 
Another issue, which is outside the scope of this Note, involves the permissibility of ex parte 
contacts that allegedly took place between the White House and agency personnel involved in 
the disposition of the antidumping investigation. 
17. See text at notes 133-68 in.fro. Broadly speaking, econometrics might be defined as the 
application of statistical technique5 to economic problems. The relationship between econom-
ics and econometrics is su=arized by one well-known econometrician as follows: "Eco-
nomic theory· is mainly concerned with relations among variables. . . . In fact, the entire 
body of economic theory can be regarded as a collection of relations among variables. . . ·. 
[E]conometrics is concerned with testing the theoretical propositions embodied in these 
relations, and with estimating the parameters involved." J. KMENTA, ELEMENTS OF 
ECONOMETRICS 197 (1971). 
18. Cf. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 62, 75-79, reprinted in (1979] U.S. CooE 
CoNG. & Ao. NEWS 448, 461-65 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 249] (discussing the sections 
of the statute pertaining to the investigation and those which pertain to the duty assessment 
procedures). 
19. The ITC will initially make a preliminary determination as to injury. See 19 U.S.C. 
§§ 1673a, l673b(a), 1673d (Supp. III 1979). If the ITC preliminary investigation is negative, 
the investigation will be terminated. Otherwise, the investigation proceeds to a preliminary 
determination by the Co=erce Department. An affirmative preliminary determination of 
sales at less than fair value will result in an order to suspend liquidation of all entries of 
merchandise subject to the determination. For each entry of merchandise, security shall be 
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to cause, lllJUry to an American industry.20 At the investigative 
stage, both the less than fair value and the injury determinations are 
made at an industry-wide level. The Commerce Department com-
pares numerous import and foreign market transactions in its less-
than-fair-value inquiry,21 and the ITC's injury determination consid-
ers the effect of allegedly dumped goods on an entire industry rather 
than on isolated :firms.22 If the investigative stage yields affirmative 
less-than-fair-value and injury determinations, an antidumping or-
der will issue.23 These orders apply to all foreign firms exporting 
merchandise of the class or kind subject to the order. 
The duty assessment stage following the issuance of an an-
tidumping order, however, is more specific in its operation. An-
tidumping orders require the Customs Service to determine the 
"U.S. price" of each entry of affected merchandise and to assess du-
ties for shipments equal to the difference, if any, between the "for-
posted to cover estimated antidumping duties. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d) (Supp. III 1979). Both 
agencies then proceed to final determinations. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d (Supp. III 1979). 
20. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. III 1979). 
21. Domestic manufacturers requesting the initiation of an antidumping investigation are 
required to submit with their application "[t]he name of the country or countries from which 
the merchandise is being, or is likely to be, exported to the United States," 19 C.F.R § 353.36 
(1981), and "[t]he names and addresses of all known foreign enterprises believed to be manu-
facturing, producing or exporting the merchandise in question." 19 C.F.R. § 353.36(a)(6) 
(1981). The regulations provide that in making a less-than-fair-value determination, "the Sec-
retary normally will examine at least 60% of the dollar volume of exports to the United States 
from any country subject to an antidumping investigation." 19 C.F.R. § 353.38(a) (1981). The 
extent of the foreign industry examined at the less-than-fair-value stage varies from case to 
case depending on various factors, including, presumably, the difficulty involved in collecting 
the relevant data. Compare Carbon Steel Plate from Japan, 42 Fed. Reg. 54,489 (1977) (notice 
of withholding of appraisement) (five companies comprising 70% of U.S. steel imports from 
Japan investigated), with Certain Fresh Winter Vegetables From Mexico, 44 Fed. Reg. 63,588, 
63,589 (1979) (tentative determination) (less-than-fair-value determination based on data from 
31 growers comprising 15-20% of U.S. vegetable imports held appropriate; no evidence that 
"enlargement of the sample would have altered the results of the investigation"). 
22. Pursuant to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 5, 13, 19, 26, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1979)), Congress formally al-
tered the injury standard in antidumping actions. The current standard is "material injury"; 
the former standard was merely "injury." It is unclear, however, whether Congress actually 
intended that the ITC take a different approach to the injury determination inquiry. 
Moreover, the precise scope of "industry" under the antidumping Act's injury inquiry is 
uncertain. The statute provides that injury to a "regional" industry is sufficient to support a 
positive injury finding, but the statute limits the application of a "regional injury" standard to 
situations where producers "sell all or ahnost all of their production of the like product in 
question in [the regional] market" and "the demand in that market is not supplied to any 
substantial degree by producers of the product in question located elsewhere in the United 
States." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(C)(i)-(ii). A former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 
Department suggests that, in some cases, the ITC might decline to find injury when the U.S. 
firms involved in the antidumping proceeding are not fairly representative of the industry at 
large. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 9, at 1380 n.68. For a comprehensive discussion of the injury 
standard, see Note, Implementing the "Tokyo Round" Commitments: The New Injury Standard 
In Antidumping and Countervailing .Duty Laws, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1183, I 187-202 (1980). 
23. 19 u.s.c;:. § 1673e(a) (Supp. III 1979). 
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eign market value" of "like merchandise" and the U.S. price.24 
These antidumping duties are designed to offset precisely the effects 
of dumping on a firm-by-firm and shipment-by-shipment basis. 
The firm-specific duty assessment stage arguably corrects errors 
introduced by the price comparison formula at the investigative 
stage. If the investigative stage yields an incorrect finding of sales at 
less than fair value, the duty assessment stage provides individual 
firms an opportunity, at least in theory, to avoid antidumping duties 
if they are not in fact selling at less than fair value. 
The possibility that the duty assessment stage may exonerate in-
dividual firms not engaging in dumping, however, does not justify 
the use of inadequate or inaccurate price comparison procedures at 
the investigative stage. To conclude otherwise would stand the Act 
on its head: It is the investigative stage, conducted under the aus-
pices of the Commerce Department and the ITC, that is intended to 
detect the existence of dumping. 25 The duty assessment stage is 
designed only to ascertain specific values for the antidumping duties 
presumably owed by individual firms subject to an industry-wide 
dumping order.26 The sale-by-sale approach at the duty assessment 
stage is a "complex, tedious and time consuming" procedure that 
24. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673e, 1673h (Supp. III 1979). 
In determining foreign market value for the purposes of assessing a duty on a particular 
entry of merchandise from a given firm, the customs field officers will compare the price of the 
entry with that of a comparable sale by the firm in the home or third market, whichever is 
applicable, or, where appropriate, with "constructed value" for that firm. See Hemmendinger, 
The Antidumping Act: Proposals for Change, l MICH. Y.B. INTL. LEGAL STUD. 124, 130 (1979) 
("After the investigation is complete and a finding of dumping has been made, [the Commerce 
Department] does not follow the averaging technique in assessing dumping duties, but looks 
for a sale in the home market with which to compare each entry in the United States."). The 
entry-by-entry duty assessment is performed with the aid of "master lists" prepared by the 
Office of Compliance of the International Trade Administration at 12-month intervals follow-
ing the issuance of an antidumping order. Each master list indicates the U.S. price and foreign 
market value on an item-by-item and period-by-period basis for the preceding 12 months. If 
foreign market value varies, separate foreign prices will be given for individual months, weeks, 
or even days, depending on the degree of variation. The U.S. price for a particular shipment 
will be compared with the foreign market value corresponding to the date of import of the 
shipment to determine the amount of the antidumping duty. See Interrogatory from John R. 
Kugelman, Import Administration Specialist for the International Trade Administration, 
Dept. of Commerce, to Michigan Law Review Association (Feb. 6, 1982) (on file with the 
Michigan Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Kugelman Interrogatory]. During the 12-month 
period preceding the issuance of the master list, the importer pays an estimated antidumping 
duty; differences between actual duties and "estimated duties" are later refunded or paid as the 
case may be. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.48, 353.50 (1981). 
25. See note 19 supra. 
26. All firms exporting from the country under investigation are subject to the antidump-
ing order unless they have been granted an exclusion. Under 19 C.F.R. § 353.45: ''The Secre-
tary may exclude one or more foreign manufacturers, producers or exporters . . . if he finds 
that all examined exports of the merchandise in question ... were made at prices not less than 
fair value. . . . Usually information on 100 percent of the exports will be required. . . . In 
exceptional cases, the secretary may ... [examine] a lesser percentage [but] ... never less 
than 75 percent." 
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should be avoided if not truly necessary.27 Case-by-case error cor-
rection at this stage is likely to be quite costly.• Foreign producers 
may revise prices upward to avoid the antidumping duties, reduce 
imports in response to the "chill" of an antidumping order, or forgo 
the American market entirely.28 For these reasons, review at the 
duty assessment stage is unlikely to prevent investigative errors from 
reducing consumer welfare. The price comparison procedure used 
at the investigative stage, therefore, should be carefully tailored to 
signal correctly the existence of dumping, regardless of whether the 
duty assessment stage might function as a palliative for firms whose 
sales should not be subject to antidumping duties. 
B. Traditional Price Comparison Formula Used at the 
Investigative Stage 
Dumping occurs when "a class or kind of merchandise is being, 
or is likely to be, sold . . . at less than its fair value."29 The Act does 
not define "fair value," but in practice fair value has been equated 
with "foreign market value,"30 a term that the Act does define.31 In 
the simplest case, foreign market value is derived from prices 
charged in the exporting country's home market for the same or sim-
ilar merchandise.32 But if there are too few usable sales in the for-
eign market to form an adequate basis for comparison,33 then 
foreign market value may be derived from prices charged for goods 
in third-country markets or from the "constructed value" of the 
27. See GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 36; see also Administration of the Antidumping Act 
of 1921, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978): 
The problem is more severe than a review of individual case backlogs will reveal. The 
antidumping program is growing, and growing at an increasing rate .... [I]n 1975 C11s• 
toms was investigating, administering or monitoring, approximately 75 cases. By July of 
1978, that number was up to 129. . . . The rate at which new cases are being filed has 
almost tripled since 1976 .... Customs is currently charged with maintaining ongoing 
lists of dumping duties on numerous grades, types, and models of products of each of 450 
manufacturers. Every model revision and price change must be reflected on these lists. 
28. See note 107 infra. 
29. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. III 1979). 
30. See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 18, at 74, reprinted at 460 (" 'Fair Value' is not defined 
in current law or in the bill. The committee intends the concept to be applied essentially as an 
estimate of what foreign market value will be .... "). See also 19 C.F.R. § 353.1 (1981) 
("Fair value, used during the investigative phase of a proceeding, is intended to be an estimate 
of foreign market value."); Ehrenhaft, supra note 9, at 1366 ("Under the Trade Agreements 
Act of 1979 there can be little doubt that 'fair value' means 'foreign market value' (FMV) -
except to the extent that the shortness of time within which the fair value determination must 
be made prevents collection and consideration of all data that would be needed for a true 
FMV calculation" (footnotes omitted)). 
31. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (Supp. III 1979). 
32. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(l)(A) (Supp. III 1979). 
33. Normally, sales in the home market are deemed inadequate for comparison if they 
constitute "less than five percent of the amount sold to third countries." 19 C.F.R. § 353.4 
(1981). 
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goods.34 Constructed value is a surrogate price based on estimates of 
production costs plus a reasonable allowance for profit and general 
expenses. 35 
Although the Act clearly states what elements may be considered 
in calculating foreign market value, neither the Act nor the adminis-
trative regulations promulgated pursuant to it offer much guidance 
on how price comparisons are to be undertaken. Comparing foreign 
market value with domestic prices is not particularly helpful if, as is 
often the case with perishables, there are many different prices in the 
foreign market. The regulations provide that a weighted average36 
foreign market value may be compared with the "U.S. price."37 
There is, however, no comparable procedure specified for arriving at 
a single U.S. price. Additionally, there is no indication whether all 
"dumping margins," or only those above some threshold level, ne-
cessitate a less-than-fair-value finding. Finally, it is unclear whether 
the price discrimination inquiry should focus on individual firms or 
on the industry as a whole. 
This absence of statutory guidance has forced the Commerce De-
partment to develop its own procedures for ascertaining whether im-
port sales are made at less than foreign market value. Under the 
traditional price comparison procedures, the Department first deter-
mines a weighted average foreign market value for each firm under 
investigation.38 Each firm's foreign market value is then compared 
with its prices to the U.S. for particular shipments over a specified 
period of time.39 The resulting dumping margins often vary from 
transaction to transaction because import prices may vary between 
34. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979). Prior to enactment of the Trade Agreements 
Act of 1979, the Antidumping Act provided that constructed value was to be used only when 
both home market and third country data were unavailable in sufficient quantities. 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677b(a)(2) now allows the administrator a choice of using "constructed value" or the third 
country standard if data on sales in the exporting country are inadequate. See S. REP. No. 
249, supra note 18, at 95-96, reprinted at 481-82, for an explanation of the reasons for this 
change. 
35. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (Supp. III 1979). The allowance cannot be less than 10% for 
general expenses and 8% for profit. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(e)(l)(B) (Supp. III 1979). 
36. A "weighted average" foreign market value is computed by weighting different prices 
by the frequency of their occurrence and then dividing by the total number of prices. Suppose, 
for example, that there were five sales at $2.00, three sales at $3.00, and two sales at $1.00 in 
the foreign market. The weighted average price would then be computed as follows: (5($2.00) 
+ 3($3.00) + 2($1.00)) + 10 = $2.10 
37. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.20 (1981). This regulation provides that if less than 80% of all 
sales are in the home market (or to third countries, if appropriate), a weighted average price 
will be used to represent foreign market value. 
38. The weighted average of prices will be used if, as will normally be the case with perish-
ables, there is no single price constituting 80% or more of all sales. In cases where there is a 
predominant price, it will be used in the price comparison formula. See note 37 supra. 
39. Pricing information covers "a period of at least 150 days prior to, and 30 days after, the 
first day of the month during which the petition was received." 19 C.F.R. § 353.38 (1981). 
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shipments even for a single importing firm.40 The weighted aver-
age41 of dumping margins for each firm42 is then divided by the 
weighted average price of the U.S. sales in question to yield a 
"dumping margin percentage"43 for each firm.44 If the dumping 
margin percentage for any firm exceeds the de minimis standard re-
lied on by the Commerce Department - in some cases as low as 
0.4% - an antidumping order will issue.45 
At least two features of the price comparison procedure tradition-
ally used by the Commerce Department tend to increase the likeli-
hood of less-than-fair-value findings. First, section 773(b) of the Act 
requires the Department to disregard certain below-cost sales when 
calculating foreign market value.46 Below-cost sales in foreign mar-
40. See notes S6-57 infra and accompanying text. 
41. See note 36 supra. 
42. See Interrogatory from David L. Binder, Acting Deputy Director, Office of Investiga-
tions, International Trade Administration, Dept. of Commerce, to Michigan Law Review As-
sociation (Oct. 29, 1981) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Binder 
Interrogatory). 
43. The Commerce Department uses the term ''weighted average dumping margin" to des-
ignate the percentage that is computed. Since the explanation of the procedures here uses that 
term in a different sense, this Note designates the percentage as a "dumping margin 
percentage." 
44. An example will clarify the Commerce Department's procedure for making less-than-
fair-value determinations. Assume the following hypothetical sales data: 
Import Price ($) Quantity Foreign Market Price ($) Quantity 
3 2 5 3 
4 l 6 4 
5 IO 9 I 
The weighted average home market price = [($5)(3) + ($6)(4) + ($9)(1)) + 8 = 6 
The margin for each import price is the difference between it and the (higher) weighted aver-
age foreign market value. The margins for the $3, $4, and $5 sales are thus $3, $2, and $1, 
respectively. 
The weighted average margin = [($3) (2) + ($2) (1) + ($1) (10)) + 13 = $1.38 
The weighted average import price = [($3)(2) + ($4)(1) + ($5)(10) + 13 = $4.62 
The percentage dumping margin = 
weighted average margin $1.38 -------''---..;;._- = -- = 30% 
weighted average import price , $4.62 
Since 30% is above the 0.4% de minimis level, an affirmative finding of less-than-fair-value 
sales would issue. See Binder Interrogatory, supra note 42. An equivalent method of comput-
ing the percentage dumping margin is to divide the total value of the margins ($18) by the total 
value of import sales ($60). This follows from the fact that the denominators in the calcula-
tions for weighted average margins and weighted average import price are identical and will 
cancel in the determination of the percentage dumping margin. 
45. This assumes, of course, that the ITC subsequently finds that there has been material 
injury. See note 22 supra. The 0.4% de minimis standard was used in Certain Iron Metal 
Castings From India; Antidumping: Final Determination of Sales at Not Less Than Fair 
Value, 46 Fed. Reg. 39,869, 39,871 (1981). At one point in the last several years the de minimls 
standard was 0.1%. Binder Interrogatory, supra note 42. 
46. For a critical commentary on this feature of the Antidumping Act, see Hemmendinger, 
supra note 24, at 132 ([T]he practice of treating sustained sales below full cost as ipso facto 
below fair value is an undesirable extension of dumping principles.). See also Barcel6, The 
Anlidumping Law: Repeal II or Revise It, l MICH. Y.B. INTL. LEGAL STUD. 53, 61-62 (1979) 
("It is a common misconception that a low dumping price is necessarily unfair if it is below 
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kets are excluded from the base used to calculate foreign market 
value if they: 
(1) have been made over an extended period of time and in substantial 
quantities; and 
(2) are not at prices which permit recovery of all costs within a reason-
able period of time in the normal course of trade.47 
Excluding these sales necessarily increases the average foreign mar-
ket value that is compared with U.S. prices. To the extent that these 
exclusions result in more substantial and more frequent discrepan-
cies between foreign market value and U.S. prices,48 they increase 
the likelihood that the dumping margin will exceed the de minimis 
w~~ . 
The second aspect of the traditional price comparison formula 
that might give rise to an unjustified finding of less-than-fair-value 
sales is the arithmetic method used to calculate weighted dumping 
margins for individual firms. These margins are calculated by sub-
tracting the U.S. price for each of a firm's import transactions from 
the foreign market value arrived at through the procedure outlined 
above.50 If the U.S. price is less than the foreign market value, a 
"positive" dumping margin results;51 if the U.S. price exceeds the 
average total cost (unit cost)."). See generally R. DALE, ANTI-DUMPING LAW IN A LIBERAL 
TRADE ORDER 25, 90-91, 199-203 (1980). 
47. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (Supp. III 1979). 
48. An example will illustrate why greater price discrepancies result from the exclusion of 
below-cost prices. Suppose the foreign market prices are as follows: $5.00, $6.00, $2.00, $4.00, 
$4.00, and $3.00. The average price is $4.00. If cost of production is $3.50, and all below-cost 
prices are excluded, the new average will be $4.75, which is $.75 higher than it would otherwise 
have been. 
Thus, § 773(b) of the Act effectively makes below-cost sales with certain characteristics 
trigger positive less-than-fair-value determinations, even if the below-cost sales are not price 
discriminatory. See Hemmendinger, supra note 24, at 132 (characterizes the below-cost sales 
provisions as one that treats "sustained sales below full cost as ipso facto below fair value"). 
See also Herzstein Hearings, supra note 14. Robert Herzstein, a noted practitioner and com-
mentator, testified in these hearings regarding his nomination to the post of Undersecretary of 
Commerce for International Trade. He indicated that the "[antidumping] statute does, how-
ever, make sales over a protracted period of time at less than cost of production to be, in effect, 
sales at less than fair value." Id. at 50. 
49. If a large number of transactions are excluded under§ 773(b), the remaining transac-
tions may be inadequate for comparison purposes. If home market sales are inadequate for 
comparison purposes, then either constructed value or prices to a third country must be used. 
See note 34 supra. But if there are no third-country sales, or if an attempt is made to use 
export prices to a third country, and these too are rendered insufficient by application of 
§ 773(b), then resort to constructed value would be mandatory. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(b) 
(Supp. III 1979). Constructed value would then be used in the traditional price comparison 
formula in place of home market or third country weighted average prices. Use of constructed 
value in this formula might also result in a dumping margin that exceeded the de minimis 
standard. It is presumably for this reason that the petitioners in Mexican Vegetables argued 
for the use of constructed value in making price comparisons. See 45 Fed. Reg. at 20,515. 
50. See note 36 supra. 
51. A positive dumping margin would result if, for example, the U.S. price were $5.00 and 
the foreign market value were $7.00. 
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foreign market value, a "negative" dumping margin results.52 But in 
calculating the weighted average dumping margin, the positive mar-
gins are summed at their full value while the negative margins are 
summed in at zero. 53 Essentially, this method disregards instances of 
U.S. prices above foreign market value. Only those prices that fall 
below foreign market value are fully factored into the weighted aver-
age dumping margin calculation. To the extent that this aspect of 
the price comparison procedure increases the dumping margin,:4 its 
effect is similar to that of the below-cost exclusion. Both procedures 
tend to increase the likelihood that the dumping margin percentage 
for any one firm will exceed the threshold value that triggers a less-
than-fair-value finding and an antidumping order. 
II. ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL 
GOODS AND PRICE VARIATION 
The Commerce Department's traditional price comparison 
formula will often yield less-than-fair-value findings in cases involv-
ing agricultural goods - particularly perishable agricultural goods 
- because the price variations associated with these goods will fre-
quently result in both positive dumping margins and below-cost 
sales. 55 Agricultural goods, on the whole, exhibit wider and more 
frequent price variations than manufactured goods. 56 Prices vary 
not only annually and seasonally, but also weekly, daily, and even 
hourly.57 Agricultural production is less stable, and less subject to 
control by producers, than manufacturing production for several 
reasons. Because most agricultural goods are harvested seasonally 
rather than continuously, growers experience annual production 
highs and lows.58 Additionally, biological and climatic factors influ-
ence both total yield and the distribution of production throughout 
the year; disease and weather often aggravate normal seasonal pat-
tems.59 As a result, yields fluctuate within any given growing sea-
52. A negative dumping margin would result if, for example, the U.S. price were $10.00 
and the foreign market value were $7.00. 
53. See Binder Interrogatory, supra note 42. 
54. See note 90 infra and accompanying text. 
55. See text at notes 74-79 infra. 
56. See R. KOHLS & J. UHL, supra note 13, at 169 ("Farm prices are more volatile than 
nonfood prices.") Kohls and Uhl indicate that: "Wide and frequent commodity price varia-
tions are the rule; stable prices of individual co=odities are the exception." Id. at 206. 
57. See id. at 206; P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 409 (9th ed. 1973); w. TOMEK & K. ROBIN• 
SON, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT PRICES 169 (1981). 
58. See R. KOHLS & J. UHL, supra note 13, at 59-60; w. TOMEK & K. ROBINSON, supra 
note 57, at 170-71. 
59. See W. TOMEK & K. ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 189 (citing the "biological nature of 
the production process which makes output partly dependent on uncertain events, including 
weather and pest damage, and creates seasonal peaks in production"). 
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son, as well as over a span of several seasons. 60 These natural 
fluctuations and the high ratio in farming of fixed to variable costs61 
prevent rapid adjustments to output in response to price changes. 62 
In economic terms, the supply curve for agricultural goods is gen-
erally inelastic,63 at least in the short run,64 and prone to shifting.65 
Complicating the picture further is a demand curve for these goods 
that is also generally conceded to be inelastic and shiftable. 66 This 
joint inelasticity and instability ensure that small changes in the 
quantity supplied or demanded will cause relatively severe varia-
tions in prices. 67 If producers can refrain from marketing their 
60. See R. KOHLS & J. UHL, supra note 13, at 58-60. For a graphic representation of the 
extreme yield variation for California tomatoes between 1950 and 1970, see E. JESSE & M. 
MACHADO, TRENDS IN PRODUCTION AND MARKETING OF CALIFORNIA FRESH MARKET TO-
MATOES 7 [fig. 4-B] (1974). 
61. See G. SHEPERD, AGRICULTURAL PRICE ANALYSIS 23-26 (5th ed. 1963); F. THOMSEN, 
AGRICULTURAL MARKETING 316 (1951). 
62. See F. THOMSEN & R. FOOTE, AGRICULTURAL PRICES 92 (1952). 
63. See R. KOHLS & J. UHL,supra note 13, at 168-69; P. SAMUELSON,supra note 57, at 403; 
W. TOMEK & K. ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 190. A perfectly inelastic supply curve is repre-
sented graphically as follows. The vertical axis represents price and the horizontal axis repre-
sents quantity supplied. 
p s 
As the graph suggests, the feature that distinguishes inelastic supply from a regular supply 
curve is the effect of price. When supply is inelastic, an increase in price will not result in 
increased supply. 
64. w. TOMEK & K. ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 97. 
65. See id. at 102. A "shift in supply" generally occurs when, owing to conditions affecting 
the entire industry, more or less goods are supplied at all prices. This is to be distinguished 
form a mere change in the quantity supplied, which occurs when consumers are willing to offer 
a greater price for the good. See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 57, at 386-87. 
66. See R. KOHLS & J. UHL, supra note 13, at 165-67, 169; P. SAMUELSON, supra note 57, at 
408. 
An inelastic demand curve is one in which the quantity demanded is unresponsive to price 
changes. It is represented graphically in the same manner as the graph in note 63 supra. 
67. See R. KOHLS &J. UHL,supra note 13, at 168-69; P. SAMUELSON,supra note 57, at403; 
see generally W. TOMEK & K. ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 97-102. The greater the inelasticity 
of the supply or demand curve, the greater the magnitude of the price change resulting from a 
given shift in supply or demand. The graphs below illustrate the effect of an equal decrease in 
demand in two situations - one with a perfectly inelastic supply and the other with a some-
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goods in times of oversupply or slack demand, however, these varia-
tions in price ordinarily can be moderated. 68 Producers of storable 
commodities like wheat, therefore, can force prices upward by cur-
tailing supply when prices are low.69 
Producers of perishable agricultural goods, however, can do little 
to counter the natural instability and unpredictability of their output. 
Perishable commodities cannot be stored for more than short peri-
ods, 70 and producers cannot respond to price changes by supplying 
more or less than what has been produced and harvested in the short 
run. The supply of perishable goods in the market thus shifts with 
natural fluctuations in production and will show little response to 
price changes in the short run.71 The supply curve for perishable 
what more elastic supply. Prices are determined by the intersection of supply and demand; the 
change in price is clearly greater in the inelastic supply case. 




8 8 ·c: ·c: ll,, ll,, 
{ { 
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Where both curves are inelastic, or nearly so, as is the case with most agricultural goods, the 
magnitude of the price changes generated by shifts in one of the curves would be even greater. 
68. W. TOMEK & K. ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 100 (Fig. 5-3 illustration of equilibrium 
price for storable commodity with fixed available supply). 
69. This is not to say that producers of storable goods have absolute control over the prices 
for their produce: 
The degree of storability of current inventories or the timing and size of the new crop 
may also influence the seasonal price pattern. End-of-season supplies of semiperishabfe 
commodities, such as apples or potatoes, are often uncertain. First, storage quality can 
vary from year to year. A poor quality would necessitate quick sales out of storage with a 
resulting small end-of-season supply. Second, storage supplies are often augmented by 
new crop production. Storage potatoes, for example, compete with new spring potatoes. 
Thus, the timing of harvest and the size of the spring potato crop influence the price of 
storage potatoes. If supplies toward the end of the storage season are short, pnces rise 
dramatically; if supplies are large, seasonal prices will rise less than normal or even 
decline. 
Id at 173. 
70. Perishability and storability are relative concepts. In agricultural economics, "a 'non-
perishable' commodity is defined as one which can be stored from one crop year to the next," 
Id at 173. See Schmitz, Firch & Hillman,Agricultural Export Dumping: The Cose of Mexican 
Winter Vegetables in the U.S. Market, 63 AM. J. AoR. EcoN. 645, 649 (suggesting that it is not 
feasible for growers of vegetables like those involved in Mexican Vegetables to store them for 
more than a "day or two" because of "their continuous production, high storage costs relative 
to the value of the product, and the deterioration of the product when stored"), 
71. Over periods longer than one growing season, the farmer will be able to influence 
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goods is, in fact, more inelastic and prone to shifting than the supply 
curve for storable agricultural goods.72 Price fluctuations of perisha-
bles in the short run will, therefore, be greater than fluctuations for 
either storable agricultural or industrial goods.73 
Perishable goods, moreover, are also frequently sold below their 
actual cost of production.74 The high incidence of below-cost sales, 
like wide and frequent price variations, results from the producers' 
inability to store perishable goods for more than short periods. In 
fact, below-cost sales are simply one manifestation of the more gen-
eral phenomenon of price variation.75 Because the producers of per-
ishables cannot curtail production in the short run,76 the only 
alternative to selling at whatever price the market offers is to let the 
produce rot.77 Producers will, therefore, always accept a price below 
average total cost if that price covers the variable costs of harvesting 
output by, for example, planting fewer or more acres. Thus, the inelasticity of supply lessens 
~ longer periods are considered. See W. TOMEK & K. ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 97. 
72. In the short-run, the supply cun:e for perishable agricultural commodities is almost 
perfectly inelastic and is often represented as a vertical line. See R. KOHLS & J. UHL, supra 
note 13, at 167-68; C. McCONNELL, ECONOMICS 417 (5th ed. 1972). 
73. The trend toward "direct" or decentralized marketing of fruits and vegetables - i.e., 
selling by individual negotiation rather than through organized markets - also may contrib-
ute to price volatility. Decentralized marketing reduces the quality and quantity of price and 
supply information and leads to a greater number of "errors in marketing decisions." See W. 
TOMEK & K. ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 218, 225-26. The greater magnitude and frequency 
of price fluctuation in perishable commodities markets has long been recognized. See A. AD-
AMS, MARKETING PERISHABLE FARM PRODUCTS 16 (1916). See generally ECONOMIC RE-
SEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, PRICES AND SPREADS FOR SELECTED FRESH 
VEGETABLES SOLD IN MAJOR MARKETS, 1967/68-1974/75 (1977), for an indication of the 
degree to which prices of particular perishable goods vary over time at the retail, wholesale, 
and farm level. Table 54, which shows monthly lettuce prices for the city of Baltimore, indi-
cates, for example, that farm level lettuce prices in January, February, March, and April 1975, 
were $3.31, $4.50, $3.19, and $2.00, respectively. 
74. See R. KOHLS & J. UHL, supra note 13, at 172-73 ("In agriculture, the perishable and 
seasonal nature of production make these short-run ... loss possibilities quite likely."). One 
of the paradoxes of agricultural production is that a boom year may lead to depressed prices 
that translate into economic loss for farmers. See, e.g., King, On The Farm, A Problem of 
Abundance, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1982, § 12 (National Economic Survey), at 30. 
75. The general case of agricultural price variation is often explained in terms of the "cob-
web phenomenon." The cobweb phenomenon refers to periodic oscillation of prices around a 
hypothetical equilibrium price that is never actually reached. See, e.g., G. SHEPERD, supra 
note 61, at 34-39 (1963). 
76. See notes 57-58 supra. 
77. See R. KOHLS & J. UHL,supra note 13, at 168 ("An owner ofa perishable product has 
little choice except to move the product at almost any price."). Later, the authors comment: 
"A low level of demand may mean that goods must sell at a loss." Id at 172. See also C. 
McCONNELL, supra note 72, at 417. Professor McConnell illustrates this principle with an 
example of a tomato producer who brings one truckload of tomatoes to market. McConnell 
explains that the tomato grower will sell his produce no matter how low the price, since the 
perishability of the produce prevents its withdrawal from market. McConnell adds: "Costs of 
production . . . will not be important in making this decision. Even though the price of the 
tomatoes may fall far short of his production costs, he will nevertheless sell out to avoid a total 
loss through spoilage." Id 
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the produce and bringing it to market.78 Because sales at any price 
greater than the cost of marketing the produce recoup some of the 
fixed or sunk costs of production, 79 rational producers will sell below 
cost in some situations. 
The structure of the market for perishable goods also tends to 
exacerbate variations in their prices, both over time and within a 
single regional market. Unlike the supply and demand conditions 
examined above, these structural peculiarities are not deducible a 
priori from economic theory80 or from the nature of perishables vis-
a-vis other commodities. For a variety ofreasons, however, the mar-
ket is rife with imperfections that cause pricing patterns to deviate 
from those that would obtain in a perfectly competitive market. At 
least in theory, prices for identical agricultural goods within the 
same perfectly competitive market should be uniform after adjusting 
for varying distribution costs. 81 Buyers and sellers would eliminate 
differences in price arising within or between markets almost imme-
diately. 82 In practice, however, market imperfections often result in 
price .differences within and between markets.83 On any given day, 
for example, the average price of strawberries in the Northeast is 
likely to vary somewhat from the average price in the Southwest, 
even after adjusting for transportation and other variable costs. 84 
78. See Schmitz, Firch & Hillman, supra note 70, at 649 ("Under these circumstances, 
when the commodity is mature enough for normal harvest, the rational farmer looks at the 
prevailing price for the product; and if that price exceeds the variable harvesting and transfer 
costs, he must harvest and sell the product."). 
79. An example will help illustrate this. Suppose that a farmer's crop has ripened, his 
average fixed costs are 10 cents per tomato, the harvesting and marketing costs are 7 cents per 
tomato, and the anticipated price is 8 cents per tomato. Under these facts, the farmer would 
rationally harvest and sell the tomatoes, even though he will not recover the average total cost 
of producing and marketing the co=odity. The farmer will recover his average harvesting 
and marketing costs and a portion (one cent) of his average fixed costs. If the produce is 
already at the market and the price of tomatoes drops to 2 cents, he will still sell because at that 
time all of his costs will have become fixed, and the two cents will at least cover a portion of 
these costs. 
From this example, it is clear that the distinction between variable costs and sunk or fixed 
costs depends on the time period being examined. In the "intermediate" period, the grower's 
sunk costs include his equipment, building, and planting costs, while harvesting, transporta-
tion, handling, and transaction costs are variable. In the market period, when the farmer has 
brought his goods to market, the variable costs, if any, are transaction costs. 
80. "Economic theory," as used here, refers to the constrained and artificial world of classi-
cal microeconomics. This world is one of scarce resources, unlimited wants, and perfect infor-
mation among rational, utility maximizing individuals (often only two) who trade without 
cost. 
81. This proposition is known as the "law of one price." See R. KOHLS & J. UHL, supra 
note 13, at 176. 
82. See id. at 176-77. This phenomenon is generally referred to as "arbitrage." 
83. See U.N. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION, MARKETING FRUIT AND VEGE-
TABLES 117 (1970); F. THOMSEN, supra note 61, at 352. 
84. See W. TOMEK & K. ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 153 (suggesting that fruit and vegeta-
bles, which are generally not priced on central markets, will exhibit some interregional price 
differences). 
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Two factors are primarily responsible for these differences. Im-
perfect knowledge on the part of sellers and buyers is probably the 
most important cause of price variations in the market for perishable 
goods. Both sellers and buyers face a market where knowledge of 
supply and demand conditions "is never perfect and frequently is 
very imperfect."85 Shipments are not always sent to markets that 
would yield the best prices; oversupply in one market and undersup-
ply in another produce price disparities.86 Imperfect knowledge 
magnifies the effect of another factor - the time lag between pro-
duction and marketing decisions based on current market conditions 
and the completion of the activities set in motion by those deci-
sions. 87 In any market, of course, this lag will cause short-run varia-
tions from the theoretical competitive equilibrium.88 But in the 
market for agricultural goods, the effect of this lag is especially se-
vere because its duration may equal or exceed the duration of the 
market condition itself. A producer of perishable goods, therefore, 
might make the best possible decision on the basis of current market 
information, but nevertheless achieve poor results because market 
conditions change before the decision can be fully implemented. 
III. PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL Gooos AND THE PURPOSES OF 
THE ANTIDUMPING ACT 
When applied to perishable agricultural goods, the traditional 
price comparison formula may indicate that a foreign producer is 
dumping goods on an American market in cases where economic 
theory suggests that price variation is normal rather than predatory. 
Because the formula used to calculate dumping margins discounts 
negative margins to zero, 89 sufficient variation in export prices to the 
United States can in and of itself trigger a less-than-fair-value deter-
mination. For example, if both the foreign market and U.S. prices 
have identical distributions, the traditional formula will necessarily 
produce positive dumping margins.90 Similarly, the frequency of be-
low-cost sales of perishable goods increases the likelihood of a find-
ing that producers have sold at less than fair value when these sales 
85. F. THOMSEN, supra note 61, at 352. 
86. Another source of price disparities between regions is quality differences in the goods 
sold. The demand curves for a particular agricultural product will vary depending on size, 
shape, maturity, and color characteristics, among others. See W. ToMEK & K. ROBINSON, 
supra note 57, at 140-44. Conventional supply and demand analysis does not deal with this 
source of price fluctuation since it presupposes that all supplies of a good are identical. 
87. See w. TOMEK & K. ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 89-91. 
88. See note 75 supra. 
89. See notes 50-54 supra and accompanying text. 
90. An illustration will make this apparent. Suppose there was one sale at each of the 
following prices in the'home market and for export to the U.S. 
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are excluded from the base used to calculate foreign market value.91 
Whether the traditional price comparison formula may be validly 
applied to perishable agricultural goods despite its apparent overin-
clusiveness depends on the resolution of two questions. First, was 
the Antidumping Act intended to proscribe the sort of nonpredatory 
variations that economic theory and the realities of the market sug-
gest will commonly occur in the prices of perishable goods? And, if 
not, do any empirical data suggest that the observed variations in the 
price of perishables might in fact be predatory? 
A. Predatory and Nonpredatory Pricing Behavior and 
Antidumping Law 
A less-than-fair-value :finding based on the application of the 
traditional price comparison formula to nonpredatory price varia-
tions in the market for perishable goods contravenes the underlying 
purposes of the antidumping law. The legislative history of the An-
tidumping Act of 1921,92 an earlier version of the current law, 
strongly suggests that Congress designed the antidumping program 
to prohibit only predatory pricing. Although there is some ambigu-
ity,93 the debates and House Report on the bill that became the 1921 
Act reveal that Congress was primarily concerned with predatory 
Bushels of Peaches 













The weighted average foreign market value would be $5.00. Using the current price compari-
son formula, positive dumping margins would obtain for the $2.00, $3.00, and $4.00 transac-
tions. These margins would be $3.00, $2.00, and $1.00 respectively. The negative and zero 
margins would be summed in at zero. The percentage dumping margin is equal to the aggre-
gate value of the "margins" divided by the aggregate value of sales to the U.S., or: 
$3.00 + $2.00 + $1.00 _ $6.00 _ 24% 
$3.00 + $2.00 + $4.00 + $5.00 + $11.00 - ,$25.00 -
This percentage is well above the .05% needed to trigger a positive less-than-fair-value deter-
mination. See Hemmendinger, supra note 24, at 130. 
If one imagines a simple model in which the average price in the home market for a given 
period is exactly the same as the average price for export to the United States, then one 
half of the sales for export must be at less-than-fair-value margins. Thus it is common 
that, under the administration of the United States law, dumping is found where, by any 
normal test, there is no dumping, and the margins found exceed the true margins. 
Id. 
91. See notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text. 
92. 42 Stat 11 (formerly 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1976)). See note 1 supra for an explanation 
of the new codification of the antidumping law. 
93. At least one commentator has argued that the ambiguity precludes any "conclusive 
assertions" about congressional intent. See Barcel6, supra note 6, at 551 n.282. 
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pricing practices that threatened to monopolize domestic markets. 94 
Because it did not wish to enact nakedly protectionist legislation, 
Congress cast the Act in distinctly antipredatory terms. According to 
the House Report, for example: 
[The Act] protects our industries and labor against a now common spe-
cies of commercial warfare of dumping goods on our markets at less 
than cost or home market value if necessary until our industries are 
destroyed, whereupon the dumping ceases and prices are raised above 
former levels to recoup dumping losses.95 
Senator Mccumber, one of the Act's principal spokesmen,96 coun-
selled trading partners that "there is no danger [of being subject to 
the Act] unless it is sought by a foreign competitor to sell goods for 
less than cost or less than they can be sold for consumption in the 
home country for the purpose of destroying an industry in this country 
"97 
More recent indications of congressional intent also support this 
antipredatory interpretation of the Antidumping Act. The Senate 
Committee Report on the Trade Act of 1974 states that "[the An-
tidumping Act] is not a protectionist statute designed to ban or re-
strict U.S. imports; rather, it is a statute designed to free U.S. imports 
from unfair price discrimination practices."98 The Report suggests 
that "unfair'' is synonymous with predatory or anticompetitive.99 
The legislative history of the New Trade Act's antidumping provi-
sions, moreover, casts no doubt on the view that American an-
tidumping law reaches only predatory activity. 100 
In the view of many commentators, this antipredatory interpreta-
tion is necessary if the antidumping law is to be justified on eco-
94. For a similar view of the legislative intent, see R. DALE, supra note 46, at 12-13; 
Coudert, The Application of the United Stales Antidumping Law in the Light of Liberal Trade 
Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 189, 190-92 (1965); Kohn, The Anlidumping Act: Its Administration 
and Place in American Trade Policy, 60 MICH. L. REV. 407, 413-14 (1962). 
95. H.R. REP. No. 1, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1921). Congress's fear of predatory market 
invasion by Germany underlay the passage of the Antidumpting Act. See W. WARES, THE 
THEORY OF DUMPING AND AMERICAN COMMERCIAL POLICY 84 (1977). 
96. Senator McCumber and Representative Fordney were the respective floor managers of 
the debate. 
97. 61 CONG. REc. 1021 (1921) (statement of Sen. McCumber) (emphasis added). See also 
61 CoNG. REC. 1022 (1921) (statement of Sen. Mccumber). 
98. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 179 (1974) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 
1298), reprinted in [1974) U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 7186, 7316. 
99. The Senate Report made the statement cited in note 98 supra in its discussion of "tech-
nical dumping," which is defined as exporting at a price that, while lower than the foreign 
market value, is at or above the prevailing prices charged in the U.S. by domestic producers. It 
then stated: "Such so-called technical dumping is not anti-competitive, hence, not unfair; it is 
pro-competitive in effect." S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 98, at 179, reprinted al 7316. 
100. The legislative history to the new antidumping provisions makes few, if any, state-
ments of policy regarding the Act. This is partly because the provisions are not all that "new"; 
"the substance of many of [the provisions of the Antidumping Act of 1921 was] reenacted." S. 
REP. No. 249, supra note 18, at 60, reprinted at 446. 
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nomic or public policy grounds. 101 Historically, the principal 
proponent of a more sweeping application of antidumping law was 
Professor Viner, 102 whose work in the field, albeit dated, is consid-
ered classic. Viner conceded that only short-term dumping - of 
which predatory dumping is the most objectionable example -
should be prohibited, but advocated a ban on all price discrimina-
tion as a prophylactic safeguard. 103 Recent economic analysis, 104 
however, severely undercuts Viner's argument and compels the con-
clusion that his approach is both overbroad and contrary to con-
sumer welfare. 105 When applied to perishable agricultural goods, 
Viner's argument seems particularly unpersuasive. Because price 
variations in the markets for these goods are both sporadic and long-
101. Antidumping laws are justified by the same kinds of considerations that underlie anti-
trust laws. See, e.g., Barcel6, supra note 6, at 500-01. These considerations include the threat 
monopoly poses to a country's labor and capital, to consumer welfare, and to the competitive 
process itself. See also W. WARES, supra note 95, at 88 (indicating that dumping duties are 
justified in cases of predation and in special cases involving imports that will cease entirely 
after a short period); Ehrenhaft, An Administrator's Look al Anlidumping J)uty Lows in United 
Stales Trade Policy, l MICH. Y.B. INTL. LEGAL STUD. 97, 104 (1979) (suggesting that dumping 
should be permitted, "absent threats that [the firm] is an economic predator or that the below-
cost sales make [it] so unreliable a supplier that we should not adjust our economy to accom-
modate to his supply"); He=endinger, supra note 24, at 124-25 ("Discrimination in pricing 
among different markets is a norm of business practice. . . . Low pricing violates the laws 
governing unfair competition only if it is predatory - designed to drive competitors out of 
business with a view to, and the capability of, monopolizing the market."). 
102. See generally J. VINER, supra note 2 .. 
103. Viner believed that most dumping was of the short-term variety, and that long-term 
dumping could not in practice be distinguished from short-term dumping. He believed that 
both forms should be prohibited by presuming that all dumping was of the short term variety. 
Id. at 139-47. Viner conceded that long-term dumping was not necessarily injurious to con-
sumer welfare, id. at 138-39, but he believed that the cost of short-term dumping in terms of 
injury to the affected industry's employment outweighed the short-term benefit of reduced 
prices to consumers. Id. at 140. 
104. Recent studies suggest that as a general matter "predatory pricing will be rare because 
it is costly and the benefits are both doubtful and in any event obtainable through less costly 
means." Barcel6, supra note 46, at 65. See generally Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the 
Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70 (1967); McGee, Predatory Price Culling: 
The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, l J. L. & EcoN. 137 (1958); Telser, Cullhroal Competition and the 
Long Purse, 9 J. L. & EcoN. 259 (1966). The would-be monopolist, Barcel6 argues, would 
have difficulty forecasting both the losses it would have to suffer before eliminating its compe-
tition and how high the price could be raised without attracting new entry. Barcel6, supra note 
46, at 65-66. See also R. DALE, supra note 46, at 32 ("both theory and evidence suggest that 
predatory pricing in general and predatory dumping in particular are rare"). 
105. Economists following Viner have demonstrated that long-term dumping is likely to 
occur whenever (I) a producer has market power in the home market, (2) the possibility of 
arbitrage is low, and (3) the price elasticity of demand is lower in the export market than the 
home market. In such cases the producer will sell at a lower price in the foreign market to 
maximize profits. See J. ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 181 (1930), 
Some observers believe that such conditions are relatively co=on. See Barcel6, supra note 
46, at 70.· The structure and goals of today's multinational enterprises also support the belief 
that dumping will often be of the long-term variety. See W. WARES, supra note 95, at 78-80. 
Insofar as long-term dumping occurs frequently, Viner's presumption that all or most dumping 
is short-term becomes untenable. For criticism ofViner's position, see R. DALE, supra note 46, 
at 30-31, Barcel6, supra note 46, at 70-71. 
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term, they injure neither consumers nor domestic industries in the 
long run. 106 
Assessing antidumping duties in cases involving nonpredatory 
price variations' will create a barrier to free trade that could cause 
economic losses in the United States. Foreign producers faced with 
an antidumping order might raise their export prices to match the 
prices that prevail in "comparable" transactions in either their home 
markets or in third-country markets rather than pay a duty repre-
senting the difference between these prices. 107 An increase in the 
prices of affected goods, of course, is likely to decrease import sales, 
with a corresponding loss of consumer welfare. 108 Over a period of 
106. Consumers, of course, benefit directly from reduced prices at a retail level. Domestic 
producers are injured only if the dumping is severe and consistent enough to drive them out of 
agricultural production entirely. Generally, this will not be the case. Farmers are often able to 
withstand prolonged periods of depressed .prices without leaving agricultural production. See 
F. THOMSEN & R. FOOTE, supra note 62, at 92-93. 
If the price of some manufactured product should fall below the costs of production of 
individual manufacturers, the latter would be driven out of business very quickly, thus 
decreasing supply and tending to raise prices. It is a difficult matter, however, to drive the 
farmer out of business, because of his ability to get along over a long period of below-cost 
prices by gradually using up his capital investment and reducing his standard of liv-
ing .... And even if the [individual] farmer were forced to relinquish his farm, someone 
else would quickly replace him. Falling prices breed idle factories but not idle farms. 
Id. (emphasis deleted). Moreover, it is unlikely that any individual farmer need experience 
severe dislocation because oflower priced imports - farmers can generally shift from produc-
tion of one perishable product to another more rapidly than a manufacturer can shift from 
production of one product to another. In fact, farm producers must routinely choose between 
various crop production possibilities in order to maximize their profits. See generally R. 
BRESSLER & R. KING, MARKETS, PRICES, AND INTERREGIONAL TRADE 292-96 (1970) (techni-
cal explanation of return maximizing choice along two product production possibility curves). 
Individual farmers also react as rapidly to price cycles as the biological cycle of the crop in 
question will permit; for most perishable crops this is one growing season. See R. KOHLS & J. 
UHL, supra note 13, at 214: 
Farmers adjust to agricultural price cycles in three ways. Most farmers contribute to cy-
cles by expanding during periods of high prices and contracting during periods of low 
prices. Other farmers opt to produce at a steady rate over the long haul, regardless of the 
cycle, averaging the high prices with the low prices. Still others attempt to gear their 
production counter to the cycle - expand when others are contracting and contract when 
others are expanding. 
107. See generally Barcel6, supra note 46, at 53. Barcel6 argues that the application of the 
antidumping law to nonpredatory dumping will diminish national welfare because it "restricts 
imports excessively and, more importantly, chills price competition ... from imports." See 
also Ehrenhaft, supra note 9, at 1382 n.78: "Both import practitioners and the Customs Serv-
ice generally agree that ... exporters co=only revise prices to avoid the imposition of an-
tidumping duties." As a result few, if any, collections were generated despite great effort and 
expense. But see GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 9: 
Importers claim that investigations cause an increase in import prices, but the extent of 
such increases is difficult to measure because of other factors, such as inflation and fluctu-
ation in currency exchange rates. It is also contended that Customs' withholding of duty 
value "appraisement" of import entries . . . causes importers to decrease their purchases 
or to seek alternate sources of supply from the exporter because of the uncertainty created 
over what prices to charge for the dumped merchandise. 
108. "Consumer Surplus" is the difference between the total amount paid for a given 
quantity of goods at a market clearing price and the total utility that those goods provide 
consumers in the aggregate. Consumer surplus is represented graphically as follows: 
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time, competition in the affected markets might also suffer because 
of the reduced volume of trade. 109 These policy considerations, as 
well as the Act's legislative history, counsel against applying the 
traditional price comparison formula in cases where nonpredatory 
variations in prices might lead to less-than-fair-value findings. 
B. Predatory Pricing in the Market for Perishable Goods 
Although economic theory predicts wide price variations and be-
low-cost sales in the market for perishable goods, these phenomena 
may evince predatory behavior in particular cases. Their presence 
does not imply a perfectly competitive market structure; market 








(Supply curve omitted for clarity) 
The market clearing price (where supply and demand are in equilibrium) is C. Consumers 
thus pay an amount equal to A-B-C-D. The utility derived from this quantity of goods, how-
ever, includes both the amount paid (A-B-C-D) and the amount (D-C-E) above the payment 
rectangle because there are consumers scattered along the demand curve above the market 
clearing price who would have paid more for the good. Obviously, the amount and distribu-
tion of consumer welfare depends on an individual consumer's willingness to pay. Consumers 
scattered along the demand curve below the market clearing price derive no consumer surplus 
because they will not purchase the good even at the market clearing price. See P. SAMUELSON, 
supra note 57, at 436-38. 
109. See, e.g., Hemmendinger, supra note 24, at 125: 
Simply beginning an antidumping investigation may have such a deterrent impact on 
importers that imports vital to the United States economy are dried up. Treasury already 
recognizes that the prosecution of an antidumping investigation may be undesirable. In 
1976 the Secretary discontinued the massive automobile cases on unprecedented grounds; 
basically, he felt that it did not serve the United States' best interests to proceed .... Not 
only are the formal investigations complex and time-consuming, more importantly, rigor-
ous enforcement of the Act (could virtually stop] ... imports, to the detriment of the 
United States Economy. 
110. See generally P. SAMUELSON, supra note 57, at 116 (Figure 6-1) (four largest firms 
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tions and below-cost sales could be the hallmarks of oligopolistic or 
monopolistic pricing. 111 A producers' cartel might discriminate 
within the American market, or between the American and other 
markets, to drive competitors out of business and acquire monopoly 
power. Price variations and below-cost selling undertaken for this 
predatory purpose would be in addition to those that the cartel's 
members experience naturally due to the supply and demand char-
acteristics of perishable goods. For this reason, it might not be obvi-
ous whether price variations or below-cost sales in a specific case are 
nonpredatory or primarily predatory in nature. 
Successful or sustained predatory pricing by growers of perisha-
ble goods is theoretically possible, but the empirical evidence sug-
gests that it is unlikely. Agricultural producers in the United States 
and elsewhere have long been used as textbook examples of firms 
operating nearest to the concept of perfect competition.112 Because 
market power in agricultural goods is widely dispersed, no producer 
or group of producers can control prices. 113 This dispersal of power 
is both a cause and a result of the difficulties of cartelization. The 
existence of many small producers114 demonstrates that no producer 
has seized a significant market share, and the number of producers 
pursuing their own economic interests dooms attempts to 
account for over 80% of dollar value of indµstry shipments in the aluminum, telephone equip-
ment, electric light bulbs, and breakfast cereal industries). The Justice Department relies on 
"concentration" ratios in its internal guidelines for determining whether to challenge mergers 
under the anti-trust laws. See P. AREEOA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 
976-80 (3d ed. 1981). 
111. See J. VINER, supra note 2, at 74-94 (surveying actual dumping practices of various 
monopolistic producer's combinations); W. WARES, supra note 95, at 84-85 (discussing the use 
of dumping and below-cost selling by monopolists for predatory purposes). 
112. R. KOHLS & J. UHL, supra note 13, at 190. See also Knight, Agriculture, in THE 
STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY (W. Adams ed. 1961) (indicating that agriculture meets 
rather well the requirements of a perfectly competitive industry, including a large number of 
sellers, standardization of product, and ease of entry into the industry). The processed food 
marketing sector, unlike the farm sector, is not perfectly competitive in structure, however. 
See R. KoHLS & J. UHL, supra note 13, at 190. 
I 13. See C. McCONNELL, supra note 72, at 622: 
Agriculture is a highly competitive industry, composed of hundreds of thousands of small 
geographically dispersed producers. As a result, farmers have no control over the prices 
at which they must sell their products. . . . Stated differently, agriculture is the last 
stronghold of pure competition in an otherwise imperfectly competitive economy. 
See R. KOHLS & J. UHL, supra note 13, at 160; J. THOMSEN & R. FOOTE, supra note 62, at 96-
97. 
114. Despite the trend toward larger farm units, economists note that the central problem 
of American farming is the stubborn refusal of individual farm entrepreneurs to exit the agri-
cultural sector in the face of increased costs and decreasing returns. See, e.g., C. McCONNELL, 
supra note 72, at 618-19: 
In a broad sense, the relative slowness of the reallocation of farmers from agriculture to 
industry is the crux of the farm problem. Ironically enough, in an industry long associ-
ated with the word 'surplus', we find that the biggest and most fundamental farm surplus 
of all is the number of farmers. Indeed, the farm problem can be correctly envisioned as a 
problem of resource misallocation. It is the fact that too many farmers are sharing agri-
culture's shrinking slice of the national income pie that makes income per farmer.small. 
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cartelize. 115 
Even if foreign producers were able to form and maintain cartels, 
the atomistic agricultural market structure in this country116 would 
frustrate their attempts to monopolize. Many growers can shift their 
production from one perishable crop to another in response to mar-
ket conditions. 117 It is thus unlikely that a domestic grower could 
ever be "destroyed" in the sense necessary to allow predatory pricers 
to reap monopoly profits. At most, domestic producers would tem-
porarily shift from one crop to another. Once the prospective mo-
nopolist raised prices, domestic growers would have an incentive to 
resume production, and natural market forces would push prices 
downward to a competitive equilibrium. The existence of actual or 
potential foreign competition also serves to check monopolization 
attempts. 
This is not to say that predatory pricing cannot occur in the mar-
ket for perishable goods. Predatory pricing remains a possibility that 
the antidumping laws must guard against. At the same time, how-
ever, those laws should reflect the only available empirical evidence, 
which indicates both that foreign producers of perishable goods are 
unlikely to engage in predatory pricing behavior, 118 and that the mo-
115. See generally F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PER· 
FORMANCE 183-86 (1970): 
One structural dimension with an obvious influence on coordination is the number and 
size distribution of sellers. Generally, the more sellers a market includes, the more difficult 
it is to maintain prices above costs, other things being equal. . . . 
(A]s the number of sellers increases, so also does the probability that at least one will 
be a maverick, pursuing an independent, aggressive pricmg policy. . . • • 
. . . Some economists have suggested that the difficulty of coordination rises nearly 
exponentially with the number of firms. 
116. For all U.S. agricultural products, farms with annual sales of over $100,000 accounted 
for only 3% of all farm units and 34% of total sales. For vegetables, farms with annual sales 
over $1,000,000 accounted for 7% of all farm units and 68% of total sales. See R. KOHLS & J. 
UHL, supra note 13, at 54. Thus, although the vegetable sector of the agricultural economy is 
more concentrated than other sectors, it is nevertheless true that "much of our production is 
made available ... in relatively small lots from a large number of relatively unspecialized 
individual units." Id at 55. 
117. See note 106 supra. The changeover cost for productive facilities is likely to be low 
for many types of agricultural goods. Even if the monopolist drives out some competitors, 
others will be beckoned into the market by any slight rise in price. See Barcel6, supra note 46, 
at 66. 
118. One study of26 antitrust cases concluded that predatory pricing designed to eliminate 
a competitor is "an infrequent occurrence of fairly insignificant competitive effects." See 
Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV, 
105, 122 (1971). There is reason to believe this phenomenon will not occur in the agricultural 
setting, see Abel, Price .Discrimination in the World Trade of Agricultural Commodities, 48 J. 
FARM ECON. 194, 207 {1966): 
Although it is possible . . . for an exporter or group of exporters to discriminate in price 
between their domestic market and the export market, it has not been the practice of 
exporters to discriminate among import markets. There is generally a single world net 
price for an agricultural commodity in world trade for all importing countries. . . . It is 
important to recognize . . . that complete monopolistic control of supply is very difficult 
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nopoly-resistant structure of domestic agriculture is likely to frus-
trate most attempts to monopolize. It thus seems fair to presume 
that price variations and below-cost selling in the markets for perish-
able goods do not evince predatory pricing, but are simply by-prod-
ucts of the economic characteristics of these goods. 
Because the traditional price comparison formula is not based on 
this presumption, it ignores economic realities and may result in the 
imposition of unjustified antidumping orders. Part IV proposes sev-
eral modifications that would reduce the difficulties involved in ap-
plying the traditional formula to perishable agricultural goods while 
e~suring that the Antidumping Act's underlying purpose - elimi-
nating predatory pricing - is fulfilled. 
IV. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO THE TRADITIONAL PRICE 
COMPARISON FORMULA 
A. Section 773(b)'s Below-Cost Sales Provision 
Section 773(b)'s exclusion of below-cost sales from the base used 
to calculate foreign market value119 may result in less-than-fair-
value findings although below-cost sales are frequently nonpreda-
tory in markets for perishable goods. 12° Categorical application of 
this. section to cases involving perishables, therefore, is contrary to 
the Act's purpose121 and to sound economic policy. 122 The Com-
to achieve. There may be many potential suppliers. Collusion among a few major export-
ers to restrict supplies and raise prices may stimulate production in those countries which 
are not in the collusive agreemP.nt and which might export at these higher prices. This 
situation poses a barrier to achieving complete monopoly control over supply. 
A U.S. Department of Agriculture study of the competitive threat posed by the importation of 
Mexican vegetables concluded: 
Mexican policies tend to discourage vegetable exports on balance. No special credit facil-
ities are available; very little extension of information and only minor research inputs are 
provided. Production and export taxes are rather high. Producer organizations are self-
financing through check-off payments per box or pound. Irrigation water is provided at 
low prices. But it is given to all crops on a more or less equal basis, and preference is 
sometimes given to basic grains if water is in short supply. 
U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, MEXICAN COMPETITION FOR THE U.S. FRESH WINTER VEGE-
TABLE MARKET (Agricultural Economic Report No. 348), [reprinted in Inspection Standards of 
Vegetable Imports, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Agricultural Policy of the Senate 
Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 95th Cong. 2d Sess., Pt. I, 93 (1978) [hereinafter 
cited as Vegetable Imports Heanilgs]]. But cf. Vegetable Imports Hearings, supra, Pt. 3, at 7 
(1978) (economist retained by Florida growers associations claimed that "centralized plan-
ning" has given the Mexican vegetable industry "market power for exceeding that of any indi-
vidual Florida grower"). 
119. See text at notes 46-49 supra. 
120. See text at notes 74-79 supra. 
121. See text at notes 92-100 supra. 
122. The below-cost sales provision was added to the antidumping law by the Trade Act of 
1974 and was left unchanged in the recodification of the antidumping law effected by the 
Trade Agreemrnts Act of 1979. The rather sparse legislative history regarding the below-cost 
sales provision indicates that Congress intended to extend the reach of the antidumping law to 
the practice of selling below cost in both the U.S. and foreign markets, a practice that does not, 
technically, constitute price discrimination. As the Senate Report to the Trade Act of 1974 
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merce Department recognized this problem in Mexican Vegetables 
and declined to apply section 773(b ). 123 
The decision to exclude certain sales as "below cost" within the 
meaning of section 773(b) depends heavily on how the Commerce 
Department interprets the conditions that trigger exclusion. 124 Be-
low-cost sales are to be disregarded only if (1) they are made in sub-
stantial quantities, (2) over an extended period of time, and (3) do 
not permit recovery of average costs within a reasonable period of 
time. 125 Because section 773(b) does not clearly indicate when spe-
cific sales should be excluded, the Commerce Department should 
construe these requirements in light of the Act's antipredatory pur-
pose.126 Only in this way will it ensure that below-cost sales made 
indicated: "The Committee is concerned that, in the absence of such a provision, sales uni-
formly made at less than cost of production could escape the purview of the Act, and thereby 
cause injury to United States industry with impunity." S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 98, at 173, 
reprinted at 7310. The Senate Report stressed, however, that the provision "would not require 
the disregarding of below-cost sales in every instance, for under normal business practice in 
both foreign countries and the United States, it is frequently necessary to sell obsolete or end-
of-model year merchandise at less than cost." Id Instead, the provision was intended to ex-
clude below-cost sales only when such sales were "systematic." Id 
The desire to prohibit various kinds of below-cost selling, irrespective of price discrimina-
tion, is not a new one. See J. VINER, supra note 2, at 147. Some commentators are concerned 
that the Act, as administered, focuses too heavily on price discrimination practices and not 
enough on the problem of below-cost selling by a producer in all markets. See Schmitz, Firch 
& Hillman, supra note 70, at 651; Herzstein Hearings, supra note 14, at 46-49 (statement of Sen. 
Stone). In questioning Robert E. Herzstein, nominee for the post of Undersecretary of Com-
merce for International Trade, Senator Stone of Florida characterized an approach based on 
price comparisons as "shocking," "ridiculous," and "irrelevant." Id at 47. To the extent that 
the below-cost sales provision is properly applied, however, this criticism seems unpersuasive. 
Indeed, the real danger appears not to be that below-cost selling will occur with impunity, but 
rather that many "innocent" cases of below-cost selling will be reached by the Act. 
123. Certain Fresh Winter Vegetables from Mexico, 45 Fed. Reg. 20,512, 20,515 (1980) 
(final determination). 
124. The importance of the interpretation of the conditions for exclusion was emphasized 
by Patrick Macrory, attorney for the Mexican interests in Mexican Vegetables, who testified 
before the House Subcommittee on Trade. Mr. Macrory urged the committee to consider 
amending the antidumping statute so as to prevent "normal" below-cost sales, such as those in 
Mexican Vegetables, from being deemed less-than-fair-value sales. Mr. Macrory acknowl-
edged the three conditions to be satisfied before below-cost sales would be excluded, but ex-
pressed fear that these would be interpreted too narrowly: ''The exception implicit in this 
language might well have been intended to cover precisely the type of situation being dis-
cussed here - i.e., sales below cost occurring in the normal course of business. However, 
Treasury appears to give it a much narrower interpretation." Multilateral Trade Negotiations: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. 549 n.3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MTN Hearings] (statement of Patrick Macrory). 
125. See 19 U.S.C. § l677b(b) (Supp. III 1979). 
126. The below-cost provision, because it applies to sales below average total cost rather 
than average variable cost, may reach selling practices that are normal and non predatory. See 
note 46 supra. In times of contracting demand, for example, "all sellers may sell at less than 
fully allocated costs, and . . . in such times it is sensible to sell so long as variable costs are 
recovered." Ehrenhaft, supra note 9, at 1361. Had a variable cost standard been adopted, 
ordinary below cost sales in the perishable goods market would presumably be outside the 
ambit of the provision. For as explained at notes 77-79 supra, the rational perishables produ-
cer will only sell if the price exceeds his variable costs. The deficiency of the "cost" standard in 
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out of economic necessity do not artificially inflate average foreign 
market value and lead to less-than-fair-value findings. 
The Act's antipredatory purpose demands that below-cost sales 
be regarded as "substantial" and occurring over an "extended" pe-
riod of time only if their volume and duration exceed the amount 
considered normal for perishable agricultural commodities sold 
under competitive conditions. 127 The standard for "normal" volume 
and duration of below-cost sales could be based on below-cost sales 
patterns for domestic growers. 128 If below-cost sales by foreign firms 
varied substantially in duration or volume from below-cost sales by 
domestic growers, this would evince the kind of predatory behavior 
that the Act properly proscribes. 
The third condition for exclusion of below-cost sales - inability 
to recover average costs in a "reasonable period of time" - should 
also be construed in light of the Act's antipredatory purpose. For 
most perishable commodities, a reasonable time period extends over 
several growing seasons; 129 growers of perishables often do not re-
cover their costs in a single season, but may instead realize a profit 
only over several growing seasons because they cannot effectively 
the below-cost sales provision makes it essential that the Commerce Department apply the 
requirements for exclusion in a reasonable way. 
The Commerce Department clearly has the authority to interpret section 773(b) in the 
manner argued for here, even if the statute does not explicitly require such an interpretation. 
Congress gave the administering authority "broad discretionary authority" in making less-
than-fair-value determinations. See F.W. Myers & Co. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 860,878 
(Cust. Ct. 1974). 
127. A study of cost recovery in the Florida vegetable industry for the years 1968-1978 
indicates "that failure to recover full cost is common not only for week-long periods but also 
for entire production seasons;" Schmitz, Firch & Hillman, supra note 70, at 649. For one type 
oflettuce, all sales were made below cost in 46 of the 151 weeks examined, and some sales 
below cost were made in all but two of the remaining weeks. Id (Table I). In one year out of 
four, Florida vegetable growers failed to cover fully allocated costs. Id at 650. 
128. The comparison with "normal" sales finds support in the legislative history to the 
provision. The Senate Finance Committee Report states: "[The three conditions for exclu-
sion] would not require the disregarding of below-cost sales in every instance, for under normal 
business practice in both foreign countries and the United States, it is frequently necessary to 
sell obsolete or end-of-model year merchandise at less than cost." (emphasis added). S. REP. 
No. 1298, supra note 98, at 173, reprinted at 7310. The sale of perishable merchandise at 
below-cost prices may be analogized to the sale of "obsolete" merchandise in the above pas-
sage. Moreover, the Treasury Department memorandum submitted to the House Ways and 
Means Committee in 1973 indicates that any amendment to the Antidumping Act regarding 
below-cost sales should not penalize inter alia the sale of "highly perishable merchandise at 
prices less than their fully allocated cost of production for limited periods of time." See Trade 
Reform: Hearings on H..R. 6767 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 2244-45 (1973). See also Certain Fresh Winter Vegetables from Mexico, 44 Fed. Reg. 
63,588, 63,591 (1979) (tentative determination) (making reference to "obsolete merchandise" 
analogy and to Treasury memorandum). 
129. In the case ofilie Florida vegetable industry, for example, it is common for a produ-
cer to go an entire season without recovering full costs. See note 127 supra. See also R. 
KoHLS & J. UHL, supra note 13, at 173-74 (using an example of an apple orchard operator to 
show that a producer may undergo several years of "very low'' prices before abandoning his 
orchard completely); note 106 supra. 
550 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 80:524 
control the quantity of goods available in the market at any given 
time. 130 Only if a grower fails to recover costs incurred over several 
growing seasons should his below-cost sales be excluded from the 
base used to calculate foreign market value. Because failure to cover 
costs over several seasons indicates that the grower may be engaging 
in predatory or manipulative practices, a less-than-fair-value finding 
is warranted. 131 The administrative decision in Mexican Vegetables 
is consistent with this view. The Commerce Department concluded 
in that case that section 773(b) should be interpreted in light of the 
"normal business practice" 132 of the domestic industry and declined 
to exclude below-cost sales of perishable vegetables imported from 
Mexico. 
B. Using Econometric Tests To .Distinguish Predatory Pricing from 
Normal Price Variation 
The methodology traditionally used by the Commerce Depart-
ment to determine the existence of dumping should be modified in 
several respects to reflect peculiarities in the markets for perishable 
goods. 133 At a minimum, the price comparison formula must fully 
account for negative margins in the calculation of weighted average 
dumping margins. 134 Including negative margins would alleviate 
some of the problems inherent in applying the current formula to 
perishable commodities. This change, however, would not prevent 
spurious results in cases where nonpredatory price variations exist 
130. See text at notes 57-60 supra. 
131. See Vegetable Imports Hearings, supra note 118, Pt. 2, at 7-8 (statement of Edward 
Schuh). Mr. Schuh, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Affairs and Commodity Pro-
grams, indicated that it is not unusual for a perishable commodity to be marketed at less than 
cost in a given year. He added, however, that "If it happens year after year, then you obvi-
ously have a problem." Id. at 8. 
In order for exclusion of below-cost sales to occur, it would also be necessary to satisfy the 
other two statutory requirements - namely, that the below cost sales be "substantial" and 
"over an extended period of time" in relation to "normal business practice." In this way, the 
likelihood of applying the provision to "innocent" below-cost selling of perishable goods is 
minimized. 
132. Certain Fresh Winter Vegetables from Mexico, 45 Fed. Reg. 20,512, 20,515 (1980) 
(final determination of sales at not less than fair value): 
... determining when to exclude below-cost sales from computation of fair value [re-
quires] ... interpret[ation] of the language of the statute in light of the normal business 
practice of the industry subject to the investigation. In this case it would be appropriate to 
disregard below-cost . . . sales only if such sales constituted 50% or more of a grower's 
total sales to [the comparison market] .... 
45 Fed. Reg. at 20,515. 
133. The Treasury and Commerce Departments felt that this deviation from the traditional 
price comparison formula was justified in Mexican Vegetables. See 44 Fed. Reg. at 63,591 
(tentative determination) ("When prices in the markets of comparison fluctuate continuously 
and substantially during the period of investigation, practices generally used in cases concern-
ing relatively stable conditions may be found inappropriate and more suitable methods may be 
used."); 45 Fed. Reg. at 20,515 (final determination). 
134. See text at note 50-54 supra. 
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between American markets and comparison markets. 135 Some vari-
ations in the prices of perishable goods between markets are to be 
expected even in the absence of predatory behavior, and these varia-
tions may result in unwarranted less-than-fair-value findings. 136 
A better method for determining the existence of predatory pric-
ing of perishable goods would distinguish between random and sys-
tematic price variations. This distinction can be made by using a 
well-accepted econometric test137 that gauges the behavior of one va-
riable in terms of the behavior of another. This test would entail 
matching the price138 of a particular good sold in the comparison 
market with the price of the same good sold in an American market 
by the same producer on the same day. 139 In the absence of dump-
ing, identical prices in the two markets would, if plotted as matched 
pairs140 of daily prices, fall on a forty-five degree line through the 
origin of a Cartesian coordinate system. Because prices will almost 
never be identical in both markets, the actual line plotted by the 
paired prices will rarely coincide with the theoretical forty-five de-
gree line. 141 Simple statistical procedures, however, can establish 
how "close," in a statistical sense, the actual line is to the theoretical 
forty-five degree line142 -ie., whether observed price variations be-
tween the domestic and comparison markets are random or provide 
135. See note 166 infra for a hypothetical example of how normal price variation in the 
U.S. and comparison markets can result in a less-than-fair-value finding under the traditional 
price comparison formula, even if negative margins were fully taken into account. 
136. See text at notes 89-91 supra. 
137. For a text that surveys basic econometric theory without presupposing advanced 
mathematic expertise on the reader's part, see J. KMENTA, supra note 17. An excellent, short 
discussion on the nature of econometrics is contained in J. JOHNSTON, ECONOMETRIC METH-
ODS 1-7 (1972). For a comprehensive treatment of probability theory and various statistical 
techniques, see D. LEABO, supra note 13. A less comprehensive but more readable text on 
probability theory and statistical techniques is L. CHAO, STATISTICS METHODS AND ANALYSIS 
(2d ed. 1974). 
138. It would still be necessary, of course, to adjust for differences in transportation costs, 
circumstances of sale, etc., in order to ensure that the prices compared were truly comparable. 
These tests do not eliminate the need to make "the myriad adjustments ... essential to permit 
a fair comparison of the price of products sold [in different] markets with differing consumer 
demands and disparate distribution organizations, not to mention separate cultures and cur-
rencies." Ehrenhaft, supra note 9, at 1367. 
139. The "comparison market" is either the home market or a third country market, de-
pending on the availability of data. Constructed value may also be used in cases of data 
insufficiency. Id See text at notes 32-34 supra. 
140. A "matched pair'' of prices consists of a U.S. and a comparison market price, each 
representing the price of identical merchandise sold on the same day by the same grower. 
141. See J. JOHNSTON, supra note 137, at 6 ("No economic data ever give an exact fit to 
simple relations of this kind since linear or other simple forms are only an approximation to 
possibly complex but unknown forms and also since only a small subset of all possible explan-
atory variables can usually be included in any specification."). 
142. Because the Co=erce Department rarely examines more than a sample of the trans-
action data, see note 154 infra, statistical methods are particularly appropriate. Cf. L. CHAO, 
supra note 137, at 5 ("Obviously, it is quite impracticable to calculate a true value of any 
population which has a large number of potential observations. Statistical investigation usu-
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evidence of predatory price discrimination. 143 
In Mexican Vegetables, the Commerce and Treasury Depart-
ments used an econometric test to conclude that the observed price 
variation between the domestic market and the comparison market 
(Canada) was nondiscriminatory. 144 The equation underlying the 
government's test can be stated in the following form: 
Pusit = ex + f3Pcit + Eusit145 
This model posits that some number Qf producers, "i," each sell per-
ishable produce at a given day, "t." Pusit is the ith produc~r's aver-
age export price to the United States on a particular day; P cit is the 
same producer's average price146 to the comparison market for mer-
ally involves the collection of partial or incomplete information called the sample, on the basis 
of which inference is made about the true parameter value."). 
143. Econometric and statistical tests require a statement of a null hypothesis (Ho), which 
is the hypothesis to be tested, and an alternative hypothesis(Ha), which is a counter hypothesis. 
See J. KMENTA, supra note 17, at 113. The null hypothesis is usually a statement that a popu-
lation parameter is equal to a ~pecified value, and will be rejected if the sample value is "very 
different" from the specified value. Id at 112-13, 116. The chosen "statistical level of signifi-
cance" (usually .05 or .01) defines what sample values are ''very different" from the hypothe-
sized value. Id at 119. 
Use of statistical procedures will not always yield a correct conclusion because of the reli-
ance on sample evidence. Id at 122. Two types of errors have been identified: Error Type I 
and Error Type II. Error Type I is the probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis 
-i.e., rejecting the null hypothesis when it is in fact true. Error Type I is given precisely by 
the chosen level of significance. Error Type II is the probability of failing to reject the null 
hypothesis when it is in fact fajse. Id Professor Jan Kmenta has analogized these concepts to 
the probability of reaching an erroneous verdict in a criminal trial: Error Type I is analogous 
to the probability of convicting an innocent man, while Error Type II is analogous to the 
probability of acquitting a guilty man. Id The probability of Error Type II can be reduced 
only at the expense of Error Type I (the level of significance), and vice versa. Id at 125. 
144. See Certain Fresh Winter Vegetables from Mexico, 44 Fed. Reg. 63,588, 63,591 (1979) 
(tentative determination) ("tentatively accepting the results of the matched pair analysis as 
reflecting no likelihood of sales at less than fair value"); Certain Fresh Winter Vegetables from 
Mexico, 45 Fed. Reg. 20,513, 20,516 (1980) (final determination) ("The results of the F-test 
performed on the regression show conclusively that there is no discrimination in the pricing of 
fresh winter vegetables sold in the U.S. compared with those sold in Canada."). The Treasury 
Department relied exclusively on the econometric test, while the Co=erce Department of-
fered additional support, including some statistical evidence, to buttress its determination of 
no sales at less than fair value. 
145. This equation is known in econometrics as a simple linear regression model. See J. 
KMENTA, supra note 17, at 201; D. LEABO, supra note 13, at 461. The Commerce Department 
made the formal assumptions that Pusit and Pcit have bivariate normal distributions, with the 
variances equal and constant from observation to observation. See Interrogatory from Dr. 
Richard L. Boyce to Michigan Law Review Association (February 8, 1982) (on file with the 
Michigan Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Boyce Interrogatory). Dr. Boyce, a former econo-
mist with the Departments ofCo=erce and Treasury, administered the econometric test used 
in Mexican Vegetables. 
146. An average of Canadian prices on a particular day was used when a given grower 
made several sales - at varying prices - on that day. See Boyce Interrogatory, supra note 
145. . 
This use of averages may create a condition known as heteroskedasticity. This problem 
can be corrected by using data sets comprising equal numbers of transactions. See generally J. 
Kmenta, supra note 17, at 249-69, 322-29 (discussing heteroskedasticity and proper estimation 
methods for "one-way grouped" data). 
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chandise of the same size sold on the same day. Eusit is a "distur-
bance" term, 147 which takes on any number of possible values within 
a normal probability distribution and represents the "random" fac-
tors such as misinformation in the market, differing supply and de-
mand conditions, and unobserved differences in quality (e.g., color 
and maturity) that might cause nonpredatory price variations be-
tween American and other markets. 
If prices in the United States were truly identical to prices in the 
producer's home market or a third-country market, the values of a 
and 13 obtained by plotting actual data on American and comparison 
market prices would be zero (0) and one (1), respectively. Estimated 
values for a and 13 for any set of data can be derived through simple 
147. The disturbance term might have a distribution as follows: 





See generally J. KMENTA, supra note 17, at 199. The presence of the disturbance term means 
that Pusit takes on any number of possible values within the same probability distribution for 
a given P Cit· This can be illustrated graphically as follows: 
Pus 
Pc 
STOCHASTIC RELATION BETWEEN Pus AND Pc 
On average, the points in the population are expected to fall on the 45 degree line represented 
in the graph. 
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linear regression. 148 The regression line is the line that best "fits" the 
actual distribution of data points created by matching domestic 
prices with prices in the comparison market. The sample regression 
line will have specific values for a and (3; a statistical test, the "F 
test,'' 149 is then applied to determine whether there is a statistically 
significant difference between these values and the values that would 
obtain for a and (3 in the absence of price discrimination. iso 
The use of this test would be advantageous for several reasons. 
The regression method that forms the core of this test is simple, and 
its use is widely accepted among professional statisticians and econo-
mists.1s I Regression analysis has been used by several courts in 
148. Linear regression involves picking the line that best fits the scatter of points so as to 
minimize the sum of the squared deviations between the actual values of Pus and the values of 
Pus on the regression line. See Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 702, 707 (1980). The estimates of a and f3 obtained by the linear regression model 
have many desirable statistical properties that make it a widely used method in forecasting and 
testing hypotheses. See generally J. KMENTA, supra note 17, at 216. 
149. The "F-test" is based on the "F distribution," which has a number of applications in 
statistics and econometrics. See generally J. KMENTA, supra note 17, at 147-50, 366-74, As 
used to determine the existence of price discrimination, the F-test jointly tests the hypotheses 
that a=0 and f3=1 in the population of perishable sales. An alternative procedure, the T-test, 
can be used to test separately these same hypotheses. The F-test is preferred, however, since it 
is a more "powerful" approach - i.e., it has a lower Error Type II. See Interrogatory from 
Professor Jan Kmenta to Michigan Law Review Association (Jan. 26, 1982) (on file with the 
Michigan Low Review) [hereinafter cited as Kmenta Interrogatory], Professor Kmenta is a 
Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan. See Appendix in.fro, for an example of 
the use of the F-test to determine the existence or nonexistence of dumping. 
150. In theory, the econometric test can be performed separately for each producer being 
investigated or for the industry as a whole. The producer-specific approach may be preferable 
since this is the approach used under the traditional methodology; however, sampling require-
ments and cost considerations may favor use of an industry-wide approach in many cases. 
The industry-wide test was used in Mexican Vegetables. See Boyce, Interrogatory, supra note 
145. 
There appears to be no doubt that the Co=erce Department has the statutory authority 
to use statistical methods in conducting less-than-fair-value investigations. The Tariff Act spe-
cifically authorizes the use of "generally recognized sampling techniques" in determining for-
eign market value, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(f) (Supp. III 1979), and the legislative history indicates 
that the authority to use these techniques applies to the investigative, as well as the duty assess-
ment stage. See SEN. REP. No. 249, supra note 18, at 96, reprinted al 482. The antidumping 
regulations also provide the Co=erce Department with authority to use statistical and 
econometric methods. 19 C.F.R. § 353.20 (1981) provides that if less than 80% of sales in the 
home market were made at the same price, and a weighted average of the prices is deemed 
inappropriate, "the Secretary will use any other method for determining value which he deems 
appropriate" (emphasis added). 19 C.F.R. 353.20(c) (1981). This provision also applies to the 
determination of "fair value," because, under § 353.1 of the regulations, "all references in the 
sub-part to foreign market value should be considered to apply to 'fair value.' " It follows that 
the Co=erce Department has the authority to use an econometric test of the kind described 
in this Note. 
15 I. See Fisher, supra note 148, at 702. Professor Fisher observed that regression analysis, 
though not a new technique, has been used increasingly in recent years: 
[Regression analysis] is not a new tool, going back in its origins to Carl Friedrich Gauss, 
an extremely important mathematician born about 200 years ago. Nevertheless, the prac-
tical use of muftiple regression has grown very substantially over the past twenty-five 
years or so. This growth is due partly to the development of modern statistical methods, 
partly to increased availability of decent statistical data, and perhaps most of all to the 
development of the electronic computer. 
Id. 
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cases involving employment discrimination. 152 Additionally, this 
test, like many other statistical tests, is valid even in cases involving 
relatively small sample sizes. 153 It is possible, therefore, that the 
Commerce Department could arrive at more correct findings with 
sample sizes much smaller than those used under the traditional 
price comparison formula, thereby expediting the less-than-fair-
value phase of an antidumping proceeding.154 Expedition would 
satisfy both domestic perishables producers - who argue that im-
port relief procedures are too slow and cumbersome to provide eff ec-
tive protection from dumping155 -and those who argue that lengthy 
152. See Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception ef Multiple Regr~ssion Studies in Race and Sex 
Discrimination Cases, 80 CoLUM. L. REV. 737 (1980). Professor Finkelstein indicates that the 
use of regression models in employment discrimination cases has become commonplace: 
The use of multiple regression models in employment discrimination cases apparently was 
first suggested in print in a 1975 student note. The idea caught on with remarkable rapid-
ity. Following publication of the note, plaintiffs begain introducing regression studies in 
many class-action discrimination cases, with the defendants usually responding with 
counterstudies. An obfuscating statistical war spread rapidly. By 1979, federal District 
Judge Fred M. Winner could complain, with only a touch of hyperbole, that Title VII 
class actions had become "contests between college professor statisticians who revel in 
discoursing about advanced statistical theory." 
Id. at 737. Regression analysis has also been used in regulatory proceedings before the Com-
modity Exchange Authority, the Federal Power Commission, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Federal Communications Commission. 
See M. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW 212-13 (1978). 
153. In principle, the F-test can be applied when the sample consists of only 3 matched 
pairs of prices. See Kmenta Interrogatory, supra note 149. Of course, much larger samples 
would be used in practice to increase the accuracy of the results. 
154. This might be particularly important in cases involving perishables, because it will 
often be difficult to gather data from more than a small percentage of all producers. In Mexi-
can Vegetables, for example, the "matched pairs" used in the regression analysis of cucumbers 
represented only 8.0% and 9.1% of the total Canadian and U.S. sales in the data base, rather 
than the 60% or more that is usually used under the traditional methodology. See 44 Fed. Reg. 
at 63,592 (tentative determination). In selecting a sample, it is necessary to observe the usual 
safeguards to ensure that the sample is not "biased." See D. LEABO, supra note 13, at 7: 
[I]n most cases the primary objective of a sample is to be as representative of the universe 
as possible. That is, the sample should be an approximate small-scale replica of the popu-
lation from which it came. If some items are more likely to be selected than others, the 
sample is biased. Any bias in a sample may lead to invalid inferences or conclusions. 
155. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 has blunted some of this criticism by shortening to 
235 days the time period within which an antidumping investigation must normally be com-
pleted. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 9, at 1371 (chart illustrating new timetable). Producers of 
perishables are unlikely to be satisfied with this shortened period of investigation since they 
have argued for a 20-day investigative period in connection with a related statute, section 201 
of the Trade Act of 1974: 
In further reference to import relief under Section 201, we support the Senate Finance 
Committee agreement for an expedited procedure calling for a 90 day investigation under 
certain circumstances. This procedure, however, does not reach certain types of potential 
injury which can befall the perishable fresh fruit and vegetable industry because of the 
very short season, perhaps 8-10 weeks. A sudden or continuing surge of imports at peak 
domestic harvest could easily destroy domestic growers however efficient they are. 
MTN Hearings, supra note 124, at 641 (statement of Diamond/Sunsweet, Inc.). See also id. at 
625 (statement of California Avocado Commission): 
Many perishable commodities have a short marketing life after harvest or are harvested in 
only a short time period each year. Market disruption from imports for such commodi-
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less-than-fair-value determinations chill imports and reduce con-
sumer welfare. 156 
One potential drawback associated with a test of this sort, how-
ever, may support the application of another statistical procedure 
known as the "difference of means" test. Implicit in the regression 
equation outlined above is the notion that American prices are deter-
mined by prices in the comparison market. 157 As Part II demon-
strated, the structure of agricultural markets and the economic 
characteristics of perishable commodities are likely to cause consid-
erable variations in prices between markets. 158 Because there is no 
reason to suppose that growers base their prices in American mar-
kets on the prices that they receive in the comparison market, the 
U.S. price is not necessarily a dependent variable relative to the 
comparison market price.159 The regression equation above, how-
ever, treats the U.S. price as a dependent variable and the compari-
son market price as an independent variable. 160 If the status of the 
variables is reversed -i.e., if the price in the comparison market is 
treated as the dependent and the U.S. price as the independent varia-
ble - the regression might yield different values of ex and (3. 161 The 
framing of this test, therefore, can in some cases influence its 
result. 162 
By using a "difference of means" test, the Commerce Department 
could avoid any difficulties that arise from the implicit presence of a 
causal hypothesis in the regression method. This test would indicate 
whether there is a statistically significant difference between the av-
erage price in American markets and the average price in compari-
son markets. The difference of means tests would, like the 
econometric test, utilize "matched pairs"163 of U.S. and comparison 
market prices. This price discrimination test would determine 
whether the difference (D) between the U.S. price and the compari-
son market price was, on average, equal to zero. 164 The test statistic 
is 
ties, if not quickly corrected, could nullify a producer's performance with that commodity 
for an entire year. Further, corrective action effective after the completion of harvest or 
marketing would not ameliorate the disruption and, in effect, would invite similar disrup-
tion in future years. 
1S6. See note 109 supra. 
1S1. See Kmenta Interrogatory, supra note 149. 
1S8. See notes 80-84 supra and accompanying text. 
1S9. See Kmenta Interrogatory, supra note 149. 
160. See text at note 14S supra. 
161. See Kmenta Interrogatory, supra note 149. Philip Howrey, an economics professor at 
the University of Michigan, was the first to recognize and apprise the author of this Note of the 
"causation" problem. 
162. Seeki .• 
163. See note 140 supra. 
164. The average of the differences, lJ, is precisely equal to the difference of the average 




where D is the average difference, n is the number of matched pairs 
and S O is the sample variance of the differences, .D. The value of the 
test statistic would be compared to the critical value on the t 
probability distribution 165 to determine whether the average differ-
ence between U.S. and comparison market prices was significantly 
different from zero.166 
Because it tests directly for the existence of a difference between 
average prices in an American market and average prices in the 
comparison market, the "difference of means" test may be preferable 
to the regression procedure in many cases. Unfortunately, the test 
may not be very discriminatory if there are not enough producers or 
comparable transactions in the two markets.167 Neither technique is 
U.S. and comparison market prices, computed from the "matched pairs." Thus, the difference 
of means test is testing the hypothesis that the average prices are equal. 
165. The "t" or "student's t" distribution is reproduced in statistics and econometrics text-
books. See, e.g., J. KMENTA, supra note 17, at 162. 
166. For an explanation of the difference of means test as applied to "matched pair" data 
see L. CHAO, STATISTICAL METHODS AND ANALYSES 271-74 (1974). 
The following example will illustrate the application of the difference of means test to 
"matched pairs" of hypothetical prices: 
Pus Pc D(Pc - Pus) 
3 4 I 
5 5 0 
4 5 I 
6 5 -1 
5.5 6 0.5 
8 7 -1 
9 8 -1 
IO 9 -1 
5 IO 5 
9.5 11 1.5 
Using the procedure outlined in note 44supra, it can be shown that these prices would yield a 
dumping margin percentage under the traditional methodology of 20.8%. If negative margins 
are taken into full account, the dumping margin percentage would be 7.69%. In each case the 
margin exceeds the de minimis value of 0.4% and a less-than-fair-value finding would issue. 
To apply the difference of means test, the sample estimate of the average difference, iJ, and the 
standard error of the differences, S 0 , must be computed. 
I+ 0 +l + (-1) + 0.5 + (-1) + (-1) + (-1) +5 + 1.5 f> = _____ ....;........;.... __ ___.;.,___.;.,_-'---'--__,;,,__,;,, ____ = .5 
IO 
l:D2 - (l:D)2/n 
sl, =------
n-1 
33.50 - 25/10 31.5 
----- = - = 3.44 
9 9 · 
s0 =v3M= 1.86 
.5 Therefore, f> 
--= =.85 
S0 /vn 1.86/3.16 
The hypothesis should be rejected if .85 is greater than lg. The value of t with 9 degrees of 
freedom at the .05 level of significance is 1.383. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no price 
discrimination is not rejected at the .05 level of significance, and a finding of no sales at less 
than fair value would issue. 
167. If exclusion of below-cost sales is necessary under§ 773(b), these sales can be ex-
cluded from the data base for the comparison market without vitiating the econometric tests. 
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foolproof, 168 and it can be expected that advocates on both sides of 
an antidumping proceeding will make use of any statistical proce-
dure that supports their position. But either or both of these well-
accepted procedures would distinguish between random and system-
atic variations in the prices of perishable agricultural goods more 
effectively than the traditional price comparison methodology. 
CONCLUSION 
Both congressional intent and economic theory suggest that the 
antidumping enforcement effort should be limited to predatory be-
havior. The identification of predatory behavior in cases involving 
perishable agricultural goods is complicated by two economic char-
acteristics of these goods - substantial price variations and frequent 
below-cost sales - that distinguish them from manufactured and 
storable agricultural goods. Because the traditional formula used to 
determine the existence of dumping fails to account for these pecu-
liar characteristics, it reaches conduct that the Antidumping Act does 
not proscribe. This formula could be improved by changing the 
treatment of negative margins in the calculation of dumping margin 
percentages and by construing section 773(b)'s below-cost sales pro-
vision consistently with the economic realities of the market for per-
ishable goods. These improvements, however, would still fail to 
distinguish normal price variations from predatory price 
discrimination. 
By using the econometric tests proposed in this Note, the Com-
merce Department could reconcile the purposes of the antidumping 
law -with the economic realities of perishable agricultural goods. 
This reconciliation, moreover, would not entail substantial costs: 
neither exotic economic expertise nor additional data are necessary 
to apply the proposed tests. The procedures underlying the tests are 
simple, straightforward, and widely accepted. The proposed tests, 
therefore, represent a clear improvement over the traditional price 
comparison formula and should be applied in cases involving perish-
able agricultural goods whenever sufficient data are available. 
Exclusion would simply change the variable for the comparison market price in the underlying 
model. Instead of representing average daily price in the comparison, the model's variable will 
represent average daily above-cost price in the comparison market. This change in the com-
parison market variable may lead to different estimates of the model's coefficients and may 
cause rejection of the null hypothesis. This is perfectly acceptable as long as the test is explicit 
about the nature of the variable underlying the model. See Kmenta Interrogatory, supra note 
149. Likewise, exclusion of below-cost sales will not invalidate the difference of means test. 
168. Professor Jan Kmenta has indicated that he would perform all three tests and make 
the difference of means result dispositive if the two formulations of the econometric test 
yielded inconsistent results, since this test is neutral from a causation standpoint. See id. 
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APPENDIX 
559 
The following example illustrates the application of regression 
analysis and the F-test to a hypothetical set of "matched pairs" of 
prices in the United States and the comparison (foreign) market. 
The "matched pairs" are: 






















The application of the traditional methodology for making less-
than-fair-value determinations would result in a positive less-than-
fair-value finding even though the average prices in the two markets 
are identical - $6. The dumping margin under the traditional 
methodology would be computed by dividing the average dumping 
margin by the average price in the U.S. Using the procedure out-
lined earlier, 169 it can easily be shown that the average dumping 
margin is $1.30. Dividing $1.30 by the average U.S. price of $6 
yields a dumping margin percentage ( often referred to as a 
"weighted average dumping margin") of 21.7%. The 21.7% figure is 
well above the usual de minimis standard, which has never exceeded 
0.4%.170 
Regression analysis and the F-test, however, would yield a nega-
tive less-than-fair-value finding. By applying the technique of linear 
least-squares regression, one can obtain a sample regression line that 
serves as an estimate of the population line, which is hypothesized to 
have a slope of 1 and a y-intercept of 0 (j. e. , in terms of the model, a 
= 0 and (3 = 1 ). The estimated values of a and (3 in the sample 
regression line are then compared, by means of the F-test, to deter-
mine whether they are "close" in a statistical sense to the hypothe-
sized values. Application of the usual procedures of least squares 
regression analysis yields a sample line with a slope of .889 and a y-
intercept of .667. The graph below depicts the hypothesized line, the 
regression line, and the actual "scatter'' or plot of the "matched 
pairs" of prices. Also indicated are the "residuals" for each of the 
169. See note 44 supra. 
170. See note 45 supra. 
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two lines. The "residual" is the vertical distance between the actual 
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Scauer Plot of "Matched Pairs" of prices. with hypothesized population line and sample re• 
gression line 
II Pc 
It is necessary to compute the sum of the squares of the residuals of 
all of the data points for each of the two lines to use the F-test to test 
the hypothesis of no price discrimination (that is, to test the hypothe-
sis that a= 0 and f3 = 1).171 Computation of the sum of the squares 
of the residuals associated with the hypothesized line (ESShyp) yields 
a figure of 38. The sum of the squares of the residuals of the regres-
sion line (ESSrcJ is 37 .111. 
Using the F-test to test jointly the hypothesis that a= 0 and f3 = 
1 is a particular application of a widely recognized use of the F-test 
involving so-called "restricted" and "unrestricted" models. 172 Fol-
lowing the general procedure, the test statistic 
171. See R. PINDYCK & D. RUBINFELD, ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND ECONOMIC FORE• 
CASTS 117-78 (2d ed. 1981). 
172. See id. 
January 1982] Note - Antidumping Law 561 
(ESShyp - ESSreJ/ q 
ESSreg/CN - k) 
must be computed. 173 Here, q, the number of restrictions, is 2, n, the 
number of observations, is 10, and k, the number of estimated pa-
rameters, is 2. If the hypotheses that ex = 0 and j3 = I are true, then 
the test statistic above will have an F distribution with q degrees of 
freedom in the numerator and N - k degrees of freedom in the de-
nominator.174 To test the hypothesis, the computed test statistic is 
compared with the value of the F distribution (which can be ob-
tained from a table) corresponding to the above degrees of freedom 
and at some significance level (usually 1 % or 5% ). If the test statistic 
is larger than the value from the F table, the null hypothesis is re-
jected, and we conclude that there is price discrimination. 175 
The value of the test statistic in this example is .096, which is less 
than the critical value in the F table at the 5% level of significance, 
4.46. For the above data, therefore, the null hypothesis would not be 
rejected at the 5% level of significance, and, contrary to the results of 
the traditional methodology, one would have to conclude that there 
is no price discrimination between the two markets. The observed 
price differences are simply the result of stochastic or random 
factors. 
173. This corresponds to the test statistic in the Pindyck and Rubinfeld text, although dif-
ferent subscripts are used here to simplify the explanation. 
174. R. PINDYCK & D. RUBINFELD, mpra note 171, at 117-18. 
175. Id. 
